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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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U.S. CLAIMS OF SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY DISPUTED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 19 Feb 82) pp 3-15

[Article by A. Astaf'yev and A. Nikonov: "U.S. Militarism--A Threat to Peace"]

[Text] At the turn of the decade, especially after the change of administrations in Washington, the militarization of U.S. and NATO policy proceeded at a much more rapid pace. Imperialist circles are relying even more than before on military strength as the main instrument for the pursuit of their foreign policy line with regard to the countries of the socialist community, the national liberation movement and the developing states. The matter has now gone so far that high-placed U.S. officials are openly making statements about the acceptability of nuclear war and possibility of winning such a war, alleging that "some things are more important than peace."

Imperialism's more active "power politics" have already led to the perceptible deterioration of the international situation and the growth of military danger. The present line of the NATO bloc, and especially that of its main force, the United States, could have a dangerous effect on the cause of world peace, L. I. Brezhnev stressed when he met with members of the Socialist International's Advisory Council on Disarmament in Moscow on 3 February 1982. The state of world affairs has never been this serious since World War II, and the responsibility for the creation of this danger is wholly and completely that of the imperialist states, especially the United States, which decided to accelerate and expand the arms race to the maximum and escalate political and military tension in the world in 1979-1981.

Ι

Viewing military strength as the main means of attaining their global foreign policy goals, the Reagan Administration and the aggressive circles of American imperialism backing it up have decided to gain military superiority [prevoskhodstva] over the USSR at any cost. In essence, the desire for this kind of superiority has colored the foreign policy, military strategy and military organizational development of the United States to some degree ever since the first postwar years. The present attempt to take action on this desire, however, is distinguished by the present military-strategic balance between the USSR and United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In recent years the existence of this balance has been acknowledged several times by leading Western statesmen, politicians, prominent

military leaders and specialists, including Americans. It has often been noted—and not only by the Soviets—that the existing balance of forces is objectively serving to keep the peace in relations between the states of the two systems and, consequently, is largely responsible for the overall improvement in international relations and has afforded considerable opportunities for advancement in the limit—ation of the arms race and the accomplishment of actual disarmament. The hope of disrupting this balance and changing it in the United States' and NATO's favor, regardless of how impracticable it might actually be, poses a threat to the people of all countries and regions, including the populations of the imperialist states. This will return the world to the dangerous practice of "brinksmanship" and a situation in which accumulated weapons will reach qualitatively and quantitatively new levels and changes in the development of military technology will be capable of undermining international stability.

To justify their militaristic aims, U.S. political and military leaders employ the obviously false allegation about the "lagging behind [otstavanii]" of the United States and NATO in the military sphere and are seeking all types of nonexistent "vulnerable spots" in their military strength. This far from new ruse has been used repeatedly in the past to "justify" each successive round of the arms race begun by the United States. This was the case in the 1950's, when the "bomber gap" was used as a pretext for intensive work on a broad program for the construction of U.S. strategic bombers, and in the 1960's, when the mass deployment of land-based ICBM's was covered up by talk about the "U.S. missile gap," and again in the 1970's, when attempts were made to employ "Soviet tank superiority" as justification for the production and deployment of neutron weapons.

This is probably the first time, however, that Washington has announced that the United States and NATO are "lagging behind" in all types of weapons, from strategic to conventional. This is the first time that the geographic boundaries of this pseudo-lag have gone so far beyond U.S. national boundaries and even NATO's official sphere of action. In other words, never before has imperialism's purported "military weakness" been portrayed as being so catastrophic as today. Finally, U.S. imperialism has never before proposed a "military muscle-building" program as sweeping and lengthy as the one proposed and carried out by the Reagan Administration.

The publication of a widely advertised Pentagon pamphlet entitled "Soviet Military Power" in fall 1981 represents one of the propaganda volleys that were supposed to weaken the opposition to the White House's militaristic plans in the United States and the rest of the world. This pamphlet, which consists of tendentiously chosen, and often deliberately distorted, facts about the Soviet Armed Forces, does not contain even the rudimentary information needed for the most general comparison of the military potential of the USSR and United States or of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This kind of comparison, however, is essential for a correct understanding of the general strategic situation in the world. The very approach chosen by the American Department of Defense and the methods used in the compilation of this work provide irrefutable evidence of the compilers' desire to mislead the public and paint a false picture of the actual state of affairs.

Here are just a few eloquent examples.

The American propagandists include the following as part of Soviet strategic potential: 1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLBM launchers and 156 heavy bombers capable of

carrying a total of around 7,000 nuclear munitions. When they cited these figures, however, the authors of the Pentagon booklet said absolutely nothing about the strategic offensive forces of the United States. They include 1,053 ICBM launchers, 648 SLBM launchers and 570 heavy and 65 medium bombers capable of taking up around 10,000 nuclear munitions in a single flight (or take-off). With their vivid description of Soviet strategic power, the compilers of the publication implied to the reader that the Soviet Union had already disrupted the balance in this area and that this had happened just recently, perhaps just in the last few years. The figures they cite, however, were no secret even when the SALT II treaty was being drafted and signed and they were recorded in a memorandum attached to the treaty to establish initial data on the quantities of strategic offensive weapons on both sides. Noting that the USSR now has a few more strategic weapon carriers than the United States, the authors of the Pentagon publication do not mention that the SALT II treaty envisaged the same number for the United States as for the USSR, with the subsequent reduction of this number from 2,400 to 2,250 on each side, and that it was precisely the United States that prevented the ratification of the treaty and, therefore, its enforcement. 1

The compilers of the U.S. propaganda publication also failed to mention another important fact--that the development and deployment of Soviet types and systems of weapons throughout the postwar period, especially in the strategic sphere, invariably represented a response to the development of such systems by the United States of America. During all these years the initiative in the creation of new weapon systems, whether nuclear weapons or intercontinental strategic bombers, nuclear submarines or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's), and other types of weapons, was held exclusively by the United States. The Soviet Union has never been a pioneer in the arms race and it does not plan to be one in the future. It has never been responsible for new rounds in this race. All that the USSR has done in the area of defense represents only a necessary response to imperialist This immutable military preparations directed against the socialist community. historical fact presents even more evidence of the truly peaceful nature of the policy of real socialism and its lack of any kind of "taste" for weapons, which some members of the present U.S. administration are portraying as something just short of "traditional."

If liberties like these are taken even when the purely factual side of the matter is being presented, there is really nothing surprising about the unscrupulous ruses used by the compilers of the Pentagon booklet in the discussion of all of the factors affecting the security of the USSR and United States. The authors imply that they know nothing about any peculiarities in the existing Soviet-American military and strategic balance. But these peculiarities do exist.

One is that the structure, composition and quantitative and qualitative levels of individual elements of the military strength of one side are not, and cannot be, a "mirror image" of the state of the other side's military strength. For one thing, the structure and composition of the armed forces and the general military organizational development of each country depend largely on the nature of its political goals, military doctrine and military strategy—in other words, on factors of a subjective nature as well as on objective circumstances: the geographic location of the state, the distinctive features of its economic development and several others. In particular, the American authors have ignored the fact that the

United States is keeping thousands of forward based [peredovogo bazirovaniya] aircraft armed with nuclear weapons close to the territory of the Soviet Union--in Europe, the Far East and the Indian Ocean. The publication says nothing about the fact that any calculations of the overall balance of Soviet and U.S. forces must include the forces of other nuclear NATO countries--Great Britain and France, which have far from anti-American aims--and the danger posed by the nuclear forces of China, which is now much more serious for the USSR than for the United States.

Another peculiarity of the existing parity [pariteta] is that it represents a state of uniquely dynamic equilibrium, in which the quantitative and qualitative levels of all weapons, including strategic arms, are constantly developing and changing. Under these conditions, each side can assign priority to the development of different types of weapons.

The overall structure of the Soviet and U.S. armed forces and their provision with specific types of weapons were naturally affected by these factors and peculiarities. The propagandists from the Pentagon, however, are ignoring these obvious facts. They have chosen to arbitrarily harp on certain types of armed forces and arms, keep quiet about information that sheds a bad light on the Pentagon and ignore the most elementary truths about the military organizational development of any country, including the United States. These are the methods they employ when they assess specific elements of Soviet military strength. For example, they have tried to convince the world public that the development of the Soviet Navy is a cause for fear and have made references to this effect regarding the new aircraft carriers "Kiev" and "Minsk" and the missile cruiser "Kirov." But they have said nothing about the fact that the United States has 20, and not 2, aircraft carriers, and it has 9, and not 1, missile cruisers. The American assessments of Soviet ground forces and our country's defense industry are just as tendentious. The Pentagon publication is filled with the most flagrant lies about the nature of Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine but does not contain even the briefest mention of the reasons why the United States has broken off an entire series of talks on various aspects of arms race limitation in recent years.

It is quite obvious that the Pentagon publication's failure to cite any data about U.S. and NATO armed forces and its refusal to take all factors into account and honestly compare the military strength of the two military-political organizations and their leading powers are certainly not the result of absentmindedness, but a completely deliberate attempt to conceal the truth. Its authors' deliberate disregard for the meaning of the very term "balance of forces [sootnosheniye sil]" and avoidance of any kind of comparison are intended to portray the Soviet Union as a "potential aggressor" and suggest to the public that there is no military and strategic balance in the world so that they can establish some type of foundation for their own plans to achieve military superiority. The very awkwardness of these propaganda exercises, however, exposes the true intentions of those who want to disrupt the existing approximate balance at any cost and ignore the Soviet Union's and socialist community's right to equal and equivalent security.

II

In Europe, where the strongest groupings of armed forces are in a position of direct confrontation, there is, just as there is in the rest of the world, an

approximate military balance between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This irrefutable fact has been repeatedly stressed by the most authoritative Soviet leaders. It has also been acknowledged, as previously noted, by U.S. and NATO military and political leaders. At present the two sides are in a state of approximate equality [primernoye ravenstvo]—in terms of strategic nuclear forces, medium—range nuclear weapons and conventional arms. Within the framework of this military balance, the West has a certain advantage [preimushchestvo] in some types of weapons, and we have it in others. This is a fact and it is corroborated with concrete comparative data in a study prepared by qualified Soviet agencies and published by the USSR Ministry of Defense's Voyenizdat. It contains an objective analysis of the correlation of East—West military forces, elucidates the present state and developmental prospects of U.S. and Soviet armed forces and military—economic potential and reveals the actual views of the two sides on detente, the preservation and consolidation of peace and the actual, and not specious, limitation of the arms race.

It is a well-known fact that the approximate balance [primernoye ravnovesiye] in the area of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear arms was repeatedly and thoroughly verified when the SALT II treaty was drafted by the most qualified experts on both sides. We can assume that the American President's signature of the treaty in summer 1979 acknowledged the existence of this balance. Soon after the signing ceremony, however, J. Carter undermined the bases of the SALT II treaty and his successor, President Reagan, began to allege that there was no state of equilibrium and that the USSR was supposedly far ahead of the United States in the area of strategic weapons. Of course, neither the previous nor the present occupant of the White House would or could cite any new facts. Furthermore, the obviously imaginary nature of the statements about Soviet superiority in this sphere had to be admitted by none other than U.S. Secretary of State Haig (previously the supreme allied commander of the NATO armed forces in Europe), who announced on 5 June 1981, when he met with some American newspaper editors in Washington, that "there is still an approximate parity between the strategic nuclear forces of our two countries."

In reference to this matter and in connection with the question of medium-range nuclear weapons, the authors of the book "Otkuda iskhodit urgroza miru" [From Whence the Threat to Peace] cogently prove, with figures in hand, that if these weapons include the main missiles and airborne nuclear weapons of the NATO countries, capable of reaching targets on Soviet territory from the territory of the Western European countries and the waters around Europe (that is, with a range of 1,000 or more kilometers), and the corresponding Soviet weapons with a similar range, deployed in the European half of the USSR, there is an approximate balance at the present time between NATO and the USSR in Europe. Furthermore, for several years the number of medium-range nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and NATO will remain approximately the same—around 1,000 on each side.

With a disregard for obvious facts, Western propaganda is now trying to allege that the USSR is striving to achieve superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons with the SS-20 missile. It is a well-known fact, however, that when the USSR decided to acquire one new missile, it withdrew one or even two old ones—the outdated SS-4 and SS-5 missiles—and scrapped them along with their launchers. It is true that the SS-20, in contrast to the old missiles, can carry three warheads, but they have less total force than one of the old ones. Consequently, when the outdated missiles were replaced, the total number of carriers decreased and the total power of Soviet

medium-range nuclear potential also decreased. Now the two sides have approximately equal nuclear potential in Europe, and this was just recently discussed by FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt, U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig and other Western leaders. Although they have recently chosen to express other opinions, the actual balance has not been affected by this.

It is more difficult to compare the general-purpose armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is due both to the large number of various systems of weapons on each side and to the fact that the Warsaw Pact countries might be superior in some areas while the NATO countries are superior in others. Even in the area of conventional arms, however, there is approximate equality. Of course, this does not mean that the number of divisions and weapons is absolute equal, but partial disparities do not undermine the overall balance [obshchego ravnovesiya]. On the whole, the combat capabilities of the NATO groups of armed forces are approximately equal to the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact states' military groupings. This also applies to the relative capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact naval forces.

There is a balance on the global and European levels. It exists, and not on paper, but in reality. It is important to stress that the USSR believes that approximate equality is sufficient for the needs of defense. It is not striving to disrupt the existing balance and achieve military superiority over the other side. Furthermore, according to the Soviet Union, the maintenance of a military-strategic balance will guarantee, under the proper conditions, the equal and equivalent security of the two sides and will objectively serve to keep the peace on our planet.

The diametrical opposite of this is the U.S. policy line. Its insistence on "additional arming [dovooruzheniye]" on the pretext that parity supposedly needs some kind of alignment is actually an attempt to change the world balance of power in the United States' own favor and to achieve military superiority.

For example, E. Meese, the American President's chief adviser, has frankly admitted that the administration's announced nuclear program for the 1980's should "restore the strategic superiority of the United States over the USSR within 10 years." Colossal amounts of funds and resources, unwarranted by any kind of defense needs, are being allocated for this purpose, which has been officially assigned chief priority by the Reagan Administration.

In this connection, it should be noted that measures taken as early as the 1970's to modernize existing U.S. strategic potential doubled the number of nuclear munitions American strategic offensive forces could deliver in a single flight (or take-off), although the number of carriers did not increase. This was accompanied by a significant rise in some tactical technical data and increased combat flexibility. The program announced for the next decade envisages a comprehensive buildup of strategic offensive weapons and is described even in the United States as the most massive program of the last 20 years. It takes in all elements of strategic forces, including the new MX ICBM's, strategic bombers, ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN's) and various types of cruise missiles.

The refitting of 300 Minuteman III ICBM's with new, more accurate warheads, which was begun in 1979, is now being completed. Twelve SSBN "Poseidons" have been re-equipped with Trident I missiles. Ronald Reagan's "strategic program"

envisages the installation of cruise missiles not only on 172 heavy B-52G bombers (the earlier plan), but also 96 B-52H bombers. A decision has been made to resume the development and production (on a qualitatively new basis) of the B-1B plane, which will be ready for use by strategic aviation units in 1986 and will also be equipped with strategic cruise missiles. Plans also call for the continuation of the work to design and build the new "Stealth" strategic bomber with the aim of putting 150 such planes in action in the 1980's. A special place in these plans has been assigned to the MX ICBM, which was designed as a weapon for the so-called "first preemptive [razoruzhayushchego] strike" and should be ready for use in 1986.

The Pentagon has great hopes for the SSBN "Trident," which represents one of the main elements of the comprehensive program for the buildup of American military strength. The first ship of this series, the "Ohio," is twice as large as existing SSBN's, has one and a half times as many missile launchers and the total power of its warheads is two and a half times as great. By 1990 effective combat strength is to be augmented by 13 SSBN's like the "Ohio" and their construction is to be continued. From 1989 on, the SSBN's should be armed with the new Trident II submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), comparable to the MX missile in terms of combat capability—that is, also capable of delivering the "first strike." Besides this, several hundred "Tomahawk" missiles with a nuclear warhead will be deployed on nuclear submarines like the "Los Angeles" beginning in 1984. As a result of this "strategic program," the Pentagon hopes to increase the nuclear potential of its strategic forces in terms of the number of nuclear charges per launching by another 50 percent in the next 10 years.

The U.S. and NATO decision to deploy another 572 American medium-range missiles in Western Europe seems particularly dangerous. If this decision should be carried out in full, the NATO countries will have one and a half times the potential of the Warsaw Pact states in terms of medium-range carriers, and NATO's superiority in nuclear charge potential will be even greater. The existing balance of nuclear weapons on both sides in Europe will be considerably shifted in NATO's favor. Besides this, the balance of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces will also shift, because the new American missiles are strategic weapons as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. When H. Brown was serving as U.S. secretary of defense, he admitted that the deployment of the "Euromissiles" would give the United States clear and indisputable superiority in the strategic sphere.

As we know, the mass production of neutron weapons, intended for use outside the United States, especially in Europe, began in 1981 in accordance with a decision by President Reagan. The deployment of this weapon on the European continent or in any other part of the world will considerably lower the so-called "nuclear threshold" and will increase the danger of nuclear war. Besides this, the neutron weapon is offensive, and not simply defensive, as the Pentagon has tried to prove.

In the last 20 years the organizational development of U.S. ground forces has emphasized the continuous buildup of offensive capabilities, strike and fire power and maneuverability on the battlefield. Troops have been trained and equipped for offensive operations involving nuclear and chemical weapons. In principle, these are also the aims of the 1980's, but with the addition of the even quicker augmentation of the qualitative parameters of general-purpose forces, the reinforcement of their material base and a new massive reorganization of the structure of ground

formations and units in connection with their provision with the latest combat equipment within the coming decade. Plans for this period also envisage the further quantitative growth of tactical fighter aviation, the buildup of naval capabilities, the development and accumulation of new weapons for the mass destruction of people and nature and the improvement of troop command and control systems.

Peace is being threatened not only by U.S. imperialism's new militaristic plans and intrigues aimed at the achievement of military superiority in the future, but also by the existing armed forces and weapons of the United States and NATO and by their daily use in imperialism's policy.

III

The present U.S. leadership has inherited a colossal and well-running military machine from its predecessors. Even it, however, seems inadequate to militaristic circles. In particular, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger spoke frankly to the Congress about the need to "revive American military strength" and said that the United States should be prepared to enter a war even today.

In line with these aims, the forces and resources of four of the five U.S. united regional commands are already deployed in peacetime outside the country, and two of the strongest groups are deployed directly west and east of the USSR's borders. Each grouping includes strategic nuclear facilities and various nuclear devices for the theater of operations and is equipped with the most modern weapons and strategic formations and units of ground, air and naval forces kept at war strength.

For the management of armed groupings deployed throughout the world, a global system of control, effective even in peacetime, has been established in the United States, including wartime operational-strategic command organs. It has been created for the reliable and continuous command and control of armed forces in a lengthy nuclear war and in military actions of smaller scales. The present administration plans to spend up to 25 billion dollars in the 1980's on the further improvement of this system.

The largest grouping of general-purpose forces deployed outside the United States is located in Western Europe. It has 336,200 personnel, the most modern offensive weapons and military equipment, and massive fire power and, in conjunction with FRG troops, constitutes the main striking power of the united NATO armed forces aimed against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. This grouping includes around 30 percent of the regular U.S. land forces, three-fourths of the United States' operational-tactical missile launchers, significant quantities of tanks and artillery, more than 5,000 antitank guided missile launchers and over 1,000 helicopters. The U.S. Air Force has around 850 planes in Europe, including 660 combat planes, two-thirds of which can deliver nuclear weapons. It is a well-known fact that more than 7,000 nuclear warheads are located in Western Europe. Besides this, the supreme commander of the U.S. armed forces in Europe has been allocated several hundred nuclear warheads for strategic SSBN missiles (the Poseidon C-3).

For combat within the NATO bloc's zone of responsibility, especially in Europe, the United States maintains the Sixth and Second Fleets in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Atlantic. They have a total of 180 warships, including 7 multipurpose aircraft

carriers, and more than 800 combat planes, at least 240 of which are carrier-based attack aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory.

The second largest general-purpose grouping is deployed in the Pacific. It has 465,000 personnel, 140 warships of various types and more than 1,100 combat planes. Much of this grouping is in the West Pacific, including South Korea and Japan-that is, in direct proximity to the Soviet Far East. A special role has been assigned to naval forces here, especially the units of the Seventh Fleet, consisting of 27 warships, including an aircraft carrier, submarines and guard ships, and more than 260 combat planes. The naval grouping in the West Pacific is to be reinforced with personnel and resources from the Third Fleet, including three aircraft carriers, 30 nuclear submarines, 80 combat ships and more than 550 combat planes.

A large U.S. naval grouping has been deployed in the Indian Ocean. Its basis consists of two aircraft carrier groups (around 20 combat ships) from the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. Up to 180 combat planes, including 80 attack aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, are based on the carriers. Plans for the reinforcement of this grouping envisage mainly the transfer of interventionist rapid deployment forces to the Near and Middle East. For the maintenance of these forces, seven permanent naval depots have been established on the island of Diego Garcia with heavy armaments and reserve supplies for the expeditionary Marine brigade.

The group of U.S. armed forces in Central and South America was created to keep the Panama Canal under U.S. control, secure the American military presence and combat the national liberation movement in this region. As the commander of the American Second Fleet recently announced, the Pentagon intends to reinforce its military presence in the Caribbean by periodically sending task forces led by two aircraft carriers to this region. He did not exclude the possibility of the creation of a permanent American force in the region.

The police functions of this group of American armed forces are most obvious and have been repeatedly confirmed by U.S. actions in this part of the world in the past. It should be stressed, however, that even the groupings in other strategic zones—the European, Pacific and Atlantic zones—are also aimed not only against the USSR and other socialist countries (including China, incidentally) but, if necessary, might also be used, and were used several times in the past, to stifle national liberation movements in various regions and prevent or suppress mass demonstrations by the laboring public in allied countries (this has been reported, for example, several times in the Western European press) and for other actions against the public. Furthermore, of the 215 cases in which American military strength was employed outside the United States during the period between the end of World War II and the end of 1975, the lion's share were situations of this very type, involving unconcealed police actions and unprovoked aggression against the people of other countries, and were not at all intended to counteract the mythical "Soviet threat."²

The distribution of American armed forces throughout the world is enough proof of the targets of the American military machine. Its main function is the prevention of progressive sociopolitical changes in the world and the guarantee of U.S. military superiority, not only in relation to the socialist countries and the national liberation struggle of peoples, but also in relation to the other imperialist powers—the United States' allies. This is also attested to by the structure of American armed forces, the announced plans for future military organizational development and the nature of U.S. military exercises.

For example, special importance has been attached to the development of U.S. naval forces, which were created and perfected primarily for the purpose of aggressive actions and overseas conquests. The "Navy-Marine" combination has always been an effective weapon for the imposition of American wishes on other states and peoples and a threat to peace. In recent years the U.S. Navy has received a larger portion of military allocations than other branches of the armed forces. During the 1960's and 1970's alone, the United States built seven of the largest aircraft carriers in the world, including three nuclear carriers, with a displacement of up to 80,000-90,000 tons and the capacity to carry up to 90 planes each. It is also significant that while the United States was engaged in this construction, the Soviet Union was developing nuclear icebreakers for the peaceful exploration of the Soviet Arctic zone. The United States plans to spend twice as much on the construction of new warships in 1983 as it will spend this year.

For direct U.S. military intervention outside NATO's zone of "responsibility," especially in the Near and Middle East, rapid deployment forces (RDF) have been created. In all, they will number 200,000 regular troops and 100,000 reserve personnel. To make up the RDF, regular Army and Navy forces alone have provided four divisions, several individual brigades, special-purpose units and ground force support materiel units, five tactical aviation groups (around 350 combat planes), 28 strategic bombers, air command points, tanker aircraft, reconnaissance planes, Air Force AWACS planes, two or three carrier strike groups, three Marine expeditionary brigades and a naval air wing.

The aggressive plans of the United States are also attested to by the structure and composition of the means for the strategic transfer of troops from the continental United States to other parts of the world which have been declared spheres of U.S. "vital interests" by the American leadership. The aircraft of the U.S. Air Force military transport aviation command include around 1,000 planes and helicopters of various types, around 600 of which are heavy and medium military transport helicopters. More than 400 reserve planes of the civil airlines (including 340 of the latest cargo and passenger aircraft) will also be used for troop transfers, as well as 350 military transport planes of the Air Force Reserve. The sea transport command of the U.S. Navy can use, in addition to its existing facilities, up to 750 ships from the national defense reserve fleet and the merchant fleet. New plans are being carried out for a further increase in the number of Navy and Air Force military transport vehicles and the augmentation of their carrying capacity. To heighten 🗈 the mobility of the Marines in the RDF, 12 more floating depots are to be built by 1987 for the storage of heavy armaments and supplies. For the same purpose, the construction of special cargo lighters, capable of delivering combat equipment and other cargo to coastal areas with no facilities, will be continued.

When Ronald Reagan moved into the White House, significant changes were made in naval policy and personnel training. Within a year, 200-220 U.S. Navy and NATO exercises with varying dimensions and purposes were conducted in oceans and seas, including 80 joint exercises. Combat training, which is camouflaged with the traditional "defensive" terminology, is of an offensive and aggressive nature and is openly directed against the USSR and other states of the socialist community. The "Global Shield" exercises, unprecedented in terms of scales and the composition of the forces and facilities involved, have been held regularly in recent years to work out plans for strategic nuclear war against the USSR. Alternative methods of waging general and "limited" wars are openly "rehearsed" during exercises of all

types, including some involving nuclear weapons, large-scale mobilization deployments and strategic troop transfers to overseas theaters are planned and performed and operations involving nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons are conducted jointly with the United States' allies.

The United States has established a developed network of military bases and facilities—more than 1,500 in 32 states—in all strategically important regions of the world. In addition to being aimed against the socialist countries, the network is also used by the United States to influence the governments of the states where these bases are located, keep them within the channel of American policy, threaten progressive regimes with the use of force, assist reactionary regimes in various parts of the world and suppress national liberation movements by force of arms.

The new types and systems of weapons developed and manufactured in the United States are also designed with a view to their deployment and use on broader scales than those which were first acknowledged publicly. In particular, the possibility of using specific types of cruise missiles in "local" conflicts and wars (that is, those outside NATO's sphere of responsibility) is already being considered in the United States.⁴

While the United States is building up its own military potential, it is also operating as the largest supplier of weapons and military equipment and is giving pro-American regimes extensive military assistance. In the last 10 years the volume of U.S. military exports more than quadrupled and totaled 17.5 billion dollars in 1980. The United States now accounts for 45 percent of all world shipments of weapons and military equipment, and the other NATO countries account for more than 20 percent. Between 1971 and 1980 the United States sent a total of 123.5 billion dollars' worth of weapons and military equipment to foreign countries. The main recipients were Saudi Arabia (35 billion dollars), Iran (14 billion), Israel (11 billion), Great Britain, the FRG and South Korea (5 billion each) and Egypt, the Netherlands, Taiwan and Japan (3 billion each). On 12 November 1981 the U.S. Secretary of State announced the administration's intention to expand military aid and engage in more active strategic cooperation only with those states which have assisted the United States in the attainment of its foreign policy goals.

Concrete evidence of the further growth of American militarism can be found in the Reagan Administration's plans to augment the growth rates and volumes of military spending and thoroughly reorganize the production base of the U.S. defense industry. In accordance with the 5-year program worked out in the United States for 1982-1986, military allocations for this period will total 1.5 trillion dollars. Even today, however, the American press is reporting that this colossal sum might be increased by another 750 billion dollars. The annual rate of increase in military spending in real terms has been set at 8.6 percent during this period, while GNP growth rates, according to American estimates, are not likely to exceed 3.5 percent a year. As a result, military expenditures will account for 6.6 percent of the GNP in 1985 and around 10 percent in 1990 (5.2 percent in 1980). The redistribution of resources in favor of military consumption will considerably augment the proportion accounted for by military spending in the U.S. federal budget: from 24.3 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1985.

Although the United States already has a strong military industry, it hopes to augment its scales and potential to such a degree that it could ensure the mass

production of weapons with the allocation of up to 50 percent of the GNP for military needs. In this context, it is significant that the United States annually spent 36 percent of its GNP on military needs during World War II, 15 percent during the Korean War and 9 percent during the war in Indochina. In other words, the present aims of American ruling circles for the preparation of the United States for war are unprecedented in 20th-century history.

The Pentagon's strategic plans focus on the delivery of the first, preemptive strike. In the full knowledge that the nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the United States are quite sufficient for compound mutual destruction, and also in the knowledge that the act of destruction is always a single act by its very nature (it is impossible to destroy someone or something more than once), the American militarists are striving to guarantee a U.S. victory in the nuclear war by delivering precisely a single mass strike against the Soviet Union. This strike has been designed to minimize the possibility of a retaliatory strike against U.S. territory.

The anti-Soviet nature of Washington's militaristic policy was directly attested to by the adoption of the new military strategy which U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger described as a strategy of "direct confrontation" between the United States and the Soviet Union on the global and regional levels. The emphasis here, just as in the previous strategy of "realistic intimidation," is on preparations for strategic nuclear war and the varied use of strategic forces in this kind of war--from so-called "limited" nuclear strikes to the massive use of strategic forces against all targets in the Soviet Union.

In the American militarists' present line of reasoning, the concept of the "first preemptive strike," the idea of "limited nuclear war" and the belief in the possibility of victory are closely interrelated. They are united by the hope that as the United States approaches "first strike" potential, American imperialism's possibility of starting and fighting "limited nuclear wars" will be widened, without any particular risk of their evolution into a worldwide nuclear missile war. This is now the alpha and omega of the U.S. Government's military doctrine and the main principle of its military strategy and military organizational development. This is the main reason for the stubborn refusal of the United States and its NATO allies to accept the proposals of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries regarding the conclusion of an agreement on no first use of nuclear or conventional weapons, as well as many other proposals intended to eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

The military strategy of the United States, which is reflected in a variety of plans for aggressive warfare to advance the global ambitions of American imperialism, the military machine created for this purpose and the new broad-scale preparations of the material base of war, including warfare involving the possibility of the unlimited use of nuclear weapons, pose an unprecedented threat to the peace, freedom and security of all peoples, including the peoples of the capitalist states, and are pushing mankind to the verge of catastrophe.

* * *

American imperialism and its most aggressive and militaristic circles simply cannot accept the fact that a military-strategic balance has taken shape in the world and

does exist. This does not suit them because the conditions of this kind of balance considerably limit imperialism's opportunities to resort to military strength with impunity as a means of safeguarding its own aggressive interests and as a way of counteracting the inevitable socioeconomic renovation of our planet. "The present military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world," the decree of the June (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed, "is an achievement of fundamental, historic significance. It will deter imperialism's aggressive aims, and this will be in the vital interest of all people. All plans to shift this balance are destined to fail."

The Soviet Union, just as all other advocates of peace, is completely satisfied with the existing balance because it objectively serves to prevent the danger of war and presents opportunities for practical steps toward the limitation of the arms race and toward disarmament. Proceeding from the interests of its own security and international security, the Soviet Union will continue to make the proper response to any attempts to disrupt this balance. Our country has never wanted military superiority, but it will not allow anyone else to achieve it either. The Soviet Union has enough experience and the necessary potential to prevent this. This is the main reason for the ultimate futility of the imperialist strategists' hope of gaining the military advantage.

Those who are inclined to forget the lessons of the recent past need a few reminders. For example, they should be reminded that the United States' attempt to achieve military superiority over our country during the years of its temporary atomic monopoly led to the appearance of Soviet nuclear weapons, and the next American attempt to gain the upper hand over the USSR, this time by starting a race for nuclear missiles, resulted in a situation in which the United States has lost its relative geographic invulnerability forever and has had to face the fact that a military-strategic balance exists. Then, just as now, the Soviet Union's actions in the military sphere were a necessary response, did not go beyond the needs of defense and were therefore completely consistent with the purely defensive aims of its military doctrine.

The Soviet Union has never wanted the military-strategic balance to be maintained by means of an arms race. It has always wanted a lower level of military confrontation, the quantitative and qualitative limitation of weapons, the cessation of the arms race and the accomplishment of disarmament, and total and universal disarmament at that. The USSR believes that any talks and agreements on arms limitation and disarmament must be based only on the principle of equality and equivalent security and must not endanger the security of either side. The Soviet Union has never taken any steps that might be contrary to this fundamental principle and disrupt the existing strategic balance. This indisputable fact cannot be denied, and is therefore being concealed in every way possible, by those who are now ranting about the "Soviet military threat."

The USSR's approach to the problem of reducing the danger of war is consistent with the innermost wishes of all people in the world. It does not want confrontation between states involving the use of military force, but it does want the security of all states to be guaranteed. The USSR's foreign policy aims of friendly relations and detente are not temporary, but reflect the Soviet Union's constant and unshakeable desire for peace. This was reaffirmed by the new Soviet initiatives

regarding nuclear weapons in Europe, set forth by L. I. Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet State, at the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982.

The unrestrained intimidation of people with the imaginary "Soviet military threat" was once a means of camouflaging U.S. imperialism's aggressive aims, but it is now turning into an instrument for the exposure of the true nature of these aims to the world public. The people of the world are responding to the militaristic policy of the United States and NATO with an increasing loud and persistent "No!"

FOOTNOTES

- 1. The figures and facts presented here and further on in the article are taken from "Otkuda iskhodit ugroza miru," Moscow, 1982, 79 pages.
- 2. See B. Blechman and S. Kaplan, "Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Wash., 1978.
- 3. "Problemy voyennoy razryadki" [The Problems of Military Detente], Moscow, 1981, p 282.
- 4. See, for example, "Cruise Missiles. Technology, Strategy, Politics," R. Betts (ed.), Wash., 1981, pp 213-230.

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ARMED FORCES

HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 12


[Article by Colonel B. Palyanitsa: "In Hand-to-Hand Combat"]


[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that under otherwise equal conditions, victory in close fighting belongs to him who is physically fit, who has mastered the special techniques of unarmed combat, who is agile and resourceful, who acts more aggressively and who displays initiative.


The best way to preserve the acquired skills of hand-to-hand combat is to improve them in integrated and tactical lessons, in incidental physical training and in time allocated for mass sports.


It is not difficult to prepare the room needed for such lessons. In summer, the techniques of hand-to-hand fighting can be practiced not only in specially outfitted areas but also on level meadows. In winter, at temperatures down to -8°, the training can be conducted on lightly packed snow as well as in a gymnasium or other room prepared for this purpose.


The best teachers organize hand-to-hand combat training in the following sequence: Preparatory exercises (somersaults and breaking falls) (Figure 1); blows with the arms and legs, and protection against them (Figure 2); immobilizing holds (Figure 3); knife attacks, disarming the opponent (based on immobilizing holds) (Figure 4); various holds and throws (Figure 5); fighting with a weapon—an automatic rifle, and disarming an opponent attempting a bayonet thrust (Figure 6). One—sided and two—sided methods can be used in the lessons.











In the one-sided group method the servicemen perform the same procedures simultaneously or one at a time without an opponent, under the overall guidance of the subunit commander. They perform the procedures either in response to commands from the lesson leader, or on their own; in the latter case the lesson leader must correct any mistakes made by the entire group or by individuals.

This method can be used successfully to practice such elements as preparation for combat, self-defense, bayonet thrusts, knife thrusts, and blows with small spades, arms and legs. The servicemen may be formed up in different ways: In a single extended row or in two extended rows spaced far apart. For example to practice thrusts with an army bayonet-knife, the command "Prepare for combat" is given. Armed with wooden or rubber mock-ups of the knife, the servicemen assume a stance in preparation for a thrust. In response to the command "Thrust up (down)," they strike (simulate a thrust) when ready.

In the two-sided group method, the procedures are studied and practiced in pairs. The students stand facing one another in two widely spaced rows and perform the procedures in response to commands or signals from the commander.

Here, for example, is how the backward throw should be taught. First the commander demonstrates the procedure in its entirety, and then in its parts, explaining what the number one and the number two man must do at each count. Then he commands:

"Assume positions for the backward throw! Number one man-grasp your opponent's sleeve at the elbow with the left hand and grasp his right shoulder with your right hand, and strike his knee with your right leg; number two man stand ready; ready, ONE! Number one man, step forward and left with the left leg, pull your opponent left and downward, seating him on your forward leg (Figure 7); number two man, stand ready; ready, TWO; number one man, without weakening your grip and keeping your balance, swing your right leg away and thrust it into the back of your opponent's knee, and with a sharp leftward and downward movement of the arms and body, tossyour opponent back and to the left, over your leg; number two man, break your fall as you land on your side; ready, THREE! To finish off the movement, number one man kick your opponent in the ribs with the right toe or dig your heel into his abdomen; if necessary, without releasing his arm, bend it behind his back and pin him down."

In order that the students could master the techniques of hand-to-hand combat better, some of the time should mandatorily be allocated for independent work. During this time, the students can perform the demonstrated procedures in pairs, taking turns.

There are great possibilities in such combat training for gradually making the exercises more difficult, bringing the conditions closer to those of real combat. It is very important to develop the soldier's capability for observing what is happening around him while he is fighting, so that he could notice the sudden appearance of another opponent, or come to the aid of a comrade in time. This can be done by simulating an attack by two or three unarmed individuals on one unarmed man, or on a man armed with a fake automatic rifle, pistol or knife; moreover, this could be done in different situations—in a foxhole, in brushwood, in a high place, inside structures and so on.

To avoid injuries and accidents during the lessons, the lesson leader should display high exactingness, and the students must maintain strict discipline.

I would like to say in conclusion that every serviceman must know how to use fire weapons as well as items of their gear or articles at hand in close fighting. They must be able to act nimbly in hand-to-hand fighting without weapons as well, proficiently enough to kill or pin down the opponent. This is the main goal of hand-to-hand fighting.

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ARMED FORCES

CARE OF UNIFORM DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 19

[Article by Senior Warrant Officer Yu. Grigorak, sergeant-major of an outstanding company, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Your Military Uniform"]

[Text] One of the important official activities of a company sergeant-major is to provide clothing to the personnel and to see that it is correctly used and maintained, and that it is expended economically and accounted for.

It may seem at first glance that there is nothing difficult about this: Make sure the uniforms you receive match up with the invoice, issue them to the soldiers, and let them wear them as they might. But in reality this is far from so. We know that the appearance of a soldier, the way he feels, his health and, in the final analysis, his fighting efficiency depend on a properly fitted uniform. This is why a sergeant-major is always concerned to see that the uniform worn by every private and NCO fits faultlessly, that the individual appears smart and neat, and that he maintains a careful attitude toward his clothing and other gear.

Clothing is issued twice a year as a rule—in April and in October; there are preparations to be made for this beforehand. The company storeroom has some simple tools manufactured by some of its handymen—foot and height measuring devices and a centimeter tape measure. I know from experience that the personnel must be measured each time before clothing is issued. Some might say that this is not mandatory. After all, company sergeant—majors do maintain clothing record cards indicating the clothing and shoe sizes, height and chest size of each soldier. But these figures change in the course of service.

Moreover, sometimes the changes are considerable. Yuriy Romanov, for example, was unusually fat when he came to us as a young soldier. With hard work, we managed to find clothing that would fit him, we widened his boots, and we inserted arch supports into them. A year later the boy had lost all of his excess weight. He assumed an athletic build, and his uniform had to be retailored. After all, clothing is issued to a soldier for the entire time of his service, and it is not subject to replacement by new clothing in the case of premature wear. This is why it is very important to always fit the uniform to the shape of each soldier.

Senior Warrant Officer I. Sviridov, chief of the clothing supply service, provides invaluable assistance to me in this. He has served more than 25 years in the army, and he has a perfect knowledge of all of the ins and outs of tailoring, maintaining and accounting for uniforms.

Under his guidance, we tailor the clothing of the soldiers in the unit's sewing shop. We devote special attention to footwear. Boots that are too large or too small become a real millstone in service.

Proper storage, use and accounting of clothing have important significance. A well equipped storeroom and clothing maintenance lounge make this possible. For example, our company storeroom has special bins for storage of gloves, socks, white belts, camouflage shirts and other clothing. So that the clothing would last longer, it is ironed before being hung up.

Our clothing maintenance lounge is small, but it is comfortable and tastefully decorated. It has everything one needs for minor repairs of footwear and clothing, and tools and devices used in daily uniform care. It should be considered that the clothing maintenance lounge is more than just a room for sewing on buttons or undercollars. It is a unique cultural center, in which soldiers learn neatness, develop a careful attitude toward their uniform and acquire the habits of tidiness and cleanliness. This is why I always make sure that soldiers on the daily detail always keep the room orderly and cozy.

I believe the morning inspection to be especially significant. As we know, it is conducted by NCOs under the supervision of the sergeant-major. Naturally, it would be impossible for me to inspect each of the soldiers. This is why I constantly teach the NCOs to conduct the morning inspection as per the regulations, and infuse each of them with neatness and with an intolerance of carelessness, negligence and sloppiness. After all, there is reason why it is said that subordinates are the mirror image of their commander.

Take as an example Junior Sergeant S. Tikhonov. At first, he treated his clothing roughly, retailoring and shortening it to get a closer fit. And it soon began falling apart at the seams. Seeing what their commander was doing, some of his subordinates began following his example. It became necessary to subject the NCO to some serious indoctrination, using the resources of the Komsomol organization and the wall newspaper. Tikhonov changed his attitude toward the maintenance of his uniform, and the appearance of his subordinates improved as well.

But in their overwhelming majority the sergeants, particularly N. Tolmachev, A. Dmitriyev, P. Dekanin and others, set a good example and demand a careful attitude toward military and public property from their soldiers.

We know that the clothing and footwear of each soldier wears differently. Most of the clothing is still good after it is returned. With permission the chief of the clothing supply service I keep a certain amount of the clothing that has served its useful life in the company, rather than surrendering it to the storeroom. These are usually boots, cotton clothing and quilted jackets. And if a certain article of clothing becomes no longer useable, the soldier is issued a used article suitable for wear, and the article that is no longer useable is returned to the storeroom. Owing to this economical practice, we now have a dependable reserve of clothing. And as a result, all privates and NCOs look neat.

We have an unofficial cobbler in our company, Private V. Shmorgun. He has created the necessary conditions for his work. Thus he always has a supply of replacement

footwear, and when necessary, any soldier could exchange worn boots for good strong ones.

We indoctrinate the personnel in the spirit of a careful attitude toward military and public property constantly. Company commander Senior Lieutenant V. Borisov, his deputy for political affairs Lieutenant V. Olenik and other officers regularly speak on this subject and strive to achieve firm military order in the subunit, which is always kept clean and cozy.

Eye-catching visual agitation in the company area is an effective resource. The lounge, for example, contains a display bearing the following words from the military oath: "I promise to do my utmost to preserve military and public property." The display also bears figures describing the cost of articles of military clothing and the material impact that could be achieved by lengthening the life of different forms of gear.

The party teaches us to be economical in all things large and small, and to maintain a thrifty attitude toward material valuables. These requirements are our perpetual guidelines in our work.

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GROUND FORCES

MOTORIZED RIFLE UNIT IN COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE W/AIR SUPPORT

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 5

[Article by Guards Sergeant N. Karamnov, section commander, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "From Helicopters in Ambush"]

[Text] Active introduction of the highly rich experience of the recent "Zapad-81" troop and naval exercise into the daily practice of combat training has become an important criterion of the combat readiness and military proficiency of our company's young Guards soldiers.


During the past tactical exercise the Guards motorized riflemen of our subunit found themselves in a complex situation, one requiring each person to display high moral and fighting qualities and the ability to successfully complete a suddenly arising task in short time.

Pursued by advancing subunits, a mixed "enemy" column was retreating on a dirt road. As the senior chief figured it, the column would reach Hill 137.3 at a certain hour (see diagram). Our motorized rifle platoon was ordered to operate as a tactical airborne assault force. We were to be landed by helicopter in the vicinity of a road intersection and then, marching on skis unnoticed, beat the "enemy" to Hill 137.3.

We never performed such missions before. But we were well informed of what a tactical airborne assault force did in the "Zapad-81" exercise. Therefore the commander made a bold decision: land the troops from helicopters hovering a few meters above the ground so that the ambush could be set up in the fastest and most covert way possible. The snow cover was quite thick enough for this.

One would think that boarding a helicopter would be simple. But we found things a lot more difficult. The skis are large, after all, and they take up a lot of room. This is why, after the first section boarded, it seemed as if there would not be any room left for anyone else. At the moment there are no training manuals that precisely explain how to get a platoon and its skis into a helicopter. And since one does not exist, perhaps our experience may be useful to other subunits finding themselves with a similar mission.

We carried the skis on board with the toe end backward and placed them on the floor at an acute angle relative to the long axis of the helicopter. Someone suggested



- 1. North
- 2. Malaya Grove

- 3. Sosnovaya Grove
- 4. Motorized rifle platoon

abandoning the ski poles, since during the landing they would be scattered in all directions by the wind force created by the main rotor. But abandoning the poles would have meant a loss of half of our speed over the snow cover. We found another solution: Just before jumping, we had to press the poles more firmly to the skis with the right fingers just a little above the bindings.

Here is one more interesting feature of our embarkation. We took our seats in the order described by Sergeant I. Savko, a participant of the "Zapad-81" exercise, in his article "Without Landing the Helicopters" (ZNAMENOSETS, No 11, 1981)—that is, in anticipation of deployment into an extended line immediately upon landing. The sequence was as follows: I would be the first to jump; behind me would be riflemangrenade thrower Private S. Soms—he would be attacking to the right of me, and then machinegumer Private D. Muratov would follow, ready to advance on the left flank; the rest of the soldiers would jump after that.

The helicopter engine strained as it raised the airborne force into the sky. At this moment, snow began to fall in large flocks, and visibility worsened.

But the landing region soon appeared before us. The helicopter approached it at low altitude. The strong air current hurled clumps of snow into the open hatch. Stepping over to the howling void, there was nothing that I could see for certain in front of me, except an impenetrable milky film: Somewhere below, the snowy mass was seething. It seemed at this time that the ground was somewhere far beneath us, and jumping into that white boiling whirlpool of cold was a very frightening thought. It was then that the helicopter commander's forewarnings that such a situation may occur came to mind. The "fear of heights" vanished, to be replaced by confidence. Pressing the skis together firmly, I pushed myself overboard, and I second later I was on the fluffy snow, up to my knees in it. A minor discovery: I found that it was much easier to land with skis than without them, since they serve as a dependable support and soften the impact.

The platoon was now on the snow. The helicopter turned onto its homeward course. The silence was deafening. All that could be heard was the scraping of the skis against the snow, and the fast, excited breathing of Private Soms behind by back.

Forestalling the "enemy," we occupied an advantageous line at Hill 137.3 and prepared for combat. By this time other subunits had concealed themselves at the edges of Malaya and Sosnovaya groves. What more could be said? The ambush was selected so well that when I mentally placed myself in the "enemy's" shoes I could not come up with any way out. I could not help but thinking at that moment how important the time factor is in modern combat! Had we been late in reaching our appointed line, it would have been difficult to say how the start of the decisive duel between the sides would have turned out.

Meanwhile, something was raising a cloud of fine snow up ahead. The "enemy" was approaching the ambush.

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GROUND FORCES

TACTICAL TRAINING PROBLEMS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 14

[Text] Problem Set No 3

1. Tank Platoon in the Offensive

The situation: During an attack, the 3d Tank Platoon was isolated from the battalion as a combat reconnaissance patrol and, traveling in the direction of Kruglaya Grove, it reached Hill 215.0, where it was fired upon by antitank guided rockets on Hill 220.5, about 3,000 meters away.

The problem: As the commander of the combat reconnaissance patrol, make a decision on the subsequent actions of the 3d Tank Platoon.


2. Motorized Rifle Detachment in Security Platoon

The 1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, 1st Motorized Rifle Company, serving as a battle outpost, occupies and defends a position with the mission of preventing a surprise attack by the enemy on the battalion's main forces and blocking his attempts at ground reconnaissance.

The 2d Motorized Rifle Detachment is operating as part of this battle outpost. It is defending a strongpoint extending from the boulder to the mound of rocks with the mission of keeping the enemy from penetrating in a direction from the barn to the lone tree. The arc of fire extends between the boulder and the bush on the right, and the rock mound and the ruins on the left; another sector of fire on the right is represented by the lone tree.

The following situation has evolved. On the right, a tank is moving toward the position, while on the left, up to a detachment of enemy infantry escorted by an armored personnel carrier has deployed and is attacking the left flank.


The problem: As commander of the 2d Motorized Rifle Detachment, make a decision and assign missions to the gunner-operator, the grenade thrower and the machinegunner.



Tank Platoon in the Offensive

- 1. Kruglaya Grove
- 2. Berezovaya Grove

3. 3d Tank Platoon




Motorized Rifle Detachment in Security Platoon

Key:

- 1. Barn
- 2. Ruins
- 3. North

- 4. Motorized rifle detachment
- 5. Motorized rifle platoon



Tank on Patrol (From an Advance Party)

- 1. North 3. 2d Tank Platoon (advance party
- 2. Patrolling tank from advance party from 1st Tank Division)

3. Tank on Patrol (From Advance Party)

Patrolling as part of an advance party, the number two tank of the 2d Tank Platoon has reached the crest of Hill 375.7, which is covered with low brush, and it observes an antitank rocket launcher deployed in the open on the east slope of Hill 350.7, a tank in an emplacement on the southwest slope of Hill 356.0, and positions of detachment strength on the south slope of Hill 350.7. Ranges are 2,100 meters to the tank and 2,800 meters to the antitank rockets.


The problem: Make a decision as the commander of the patrolling tank.

Answers to Problem Set No 2


1. Tank in Defense

Solution: The angle of safe fire over the heads of motorized rifle subunits is 17-12 mils. The sighting angle corresponding to the range to the target is 18 mils. The field of view is 7 mils. The sum of the sighting angle and field of view is 25 mils, which is greater than the safety angle.

Answer: This target can be fired on by the gun without endangering friendly troops.




- 1. Line of elevation
- 2. Safety angle
- 3. Gun-target angle
- 4. Sighting angle
- 5. Field of view



Key:

- 1. North
- 2. To Yagadnoye
- 3. Dubki
- 4. Ruins
- 5. Rydinka River



Key:

- Yur'yevka
- 2. Baykov Forest

- 3. Kamenka River
- 4. North

2. Motorized Rifle Detachment in Ambush

Solution: The detachment commander makes the decision to penetrate to the ruins of the hut covertly through the rushes, organize an ambush, maintain observation over the advance of the enemy unit, and then, at a convenient moment, capture a prisoner (for interrogation) and deliver him to battalion headquarters.

The position for the ambush is dependable (presence of the ruined hut with, moreover, rushes nearby which could provide concealment). The road traveled by enemy subunits can be seen well from this position. The commander decided to capture his prisoner for interrogation at night, and to conceal his detachment in brush beside the road. The basic plan was to capture the prisoner when a lone vehicles halts. The first contingency plan was to attack a vehicle traveling on its own. The second contingency plan was to capture a lone vehicle and travel the same route as the enemy subunit until a later point, when the vehicle and prisoner would be diverted to battalion headquarters.

3. Reconnaissance Detachment on Fighting Patrol

The machinegunner at the position beside Baykov Forest southwest of the bridge is a suitable objective of the fighting patrol, since the position is somewhat isolated from the platoon defending Hill 90.8 beyond the river; the canyon and forest also isolate him from his neighbor on the left.

There are open approaches to the objective.

The "snatch" group consists of three persons, and the breaching team consists of two. The fire support group of five men is divided into two subgroups (No 2--three persons, No 3--two persons).

The route of advance to the objective of the fighting patrol is down the north slope of Hill 75.6, to the broken tree and along the river to Baykov Forest.

The order of advance: Fire support group, breaching team, "snatch" group.

It would be suitable to start for the objective of the fighting patrol at 2400 hours, so that the party could return to its positions while it is still dark. The forming-up place for capture of the prisoner should be occupied at 0100 hours. One of the subgroups provides cover to the "snatch" group on the forest side while the other provides cover from the river side. The breaching team clears a passage through the obstacles and provides security to it.

The detachment withdraws in the following order: "Snatch" group and prisoner, fire support group No 3, fire support group No 2.

If the fighting patrol is successful, the route of withdrawal is from the edge of the forest through the brushwood to Hill 75.6.

If the fighting group is discovered by the enemy, the route of withdrawal remains the same except for fire support subgroup No 3, which travels from the knoll through the brushwood to the forest, diverting the enemy to itself by its fire.

Competition Participants, Attention!

- 1. When making a decision in behalf of the commander, indicate only one method of completing the mission in your responses, rather than several variants of action.
- 2. Each competitor solves only one problem of each problem set.

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GROUND FORCES

PROBLEMS WITH NCO TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) pp 6-7

[Article by Colonel G. Kuvitanov, ZNAMENOSETS correspondent, Red Banner Baltic Military District: "Is This the Way to Teach NCOs?"]

[Text] On a centrally located tower, a white flag was replaced by a red one, and the signal for combat echoed over the snow-covered training ground: We could all fire at will. One of the subunits placed into motion by this call to combat was a motorized rifle company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Gorelyshev, which was taking its training at the artillery training school. Soon the crews disappeared into the infantry combat vehicles, which were mounted on "swings."

"Crew ready for combat!" Guards Junior Sergenat A. Shot', one of the first to report, had to do so by shouting through the open hatch of his vehicle.

"The radio station in the tower is not working yet," the company commander explained to me. "We're taking steps to correct the problem."

The targets appeared. Rather than reporting the target clearly and concisely, gunner-operator Private U. Parve described what he saw to the commander in a rather long speech. In turn, Junior Sergeant Shot' gave the command to open fire, but not in the proper way. A fiery tracer cleaved through the frosty air. It was quite evident that it missed the target on the right.

"A little left!" Guards Senior Sergeant Shot' corrected by eye, contrary to the strict rules of fire. But no one pointed out the section commander's mistake to him, even though the officers of the company were standing right there. "A little to the right," "A little higher," "A tiny bit lower"--the junior sergeant continued to correct the fire after every subsequent miss. But the bullets kept flying past the target.

Fire training went no better in the other crews either. Lack of organization, absence of any sort of competitiveness between the specialists and the poor preparedness of the NCOs as instructors were obvious. Throughout the entire time of training there was no radio communication between the training combat vehicles, mounted on rocking frames, and the tower occupied by the range officer. Attempts by NCOs and the company commander himself to restore it were to no avail. Section commander Guards Sergeant A. Rustamov worked with his subordinates on training

problems having no relationship to the subject matter of an artillery training school. For about an hour they studied the layout of the automatic rifle and machinegum, which is usually done in a fire training classroom.

Guards Sergeant A. Melkolyan conducted an exercise on determining the envelope of fire. At this training station, when the lessons are competently organized, the training is always interesting and intensive. The best NCOs structure their training in such a way that the students, by repeating the procedures several times in a competitive atmosphere, could develop swiftness and automatic actions at their control consoles and with the manual weapon aiming mechanisms.

Huddling in the cold, Guards Sergeant Melkolyan impassionately watched the stylus of the pantograph lazily slide across the paper, leaving a stepped trace. Guards Private M. Guseynov was behind the gunsight at this time. The limit of the combat standard for a satisfactory grade had been passed long ago, but the gunner had not traced the outline of even half of the complex shape yet.

Finally the lead pencil closed the outline of the envelope. The student elevated the gun and reported completion of the exercise. The section commander now had to make a brief critique of his subordinate's actions, indicate his errors and score his work. But rather than doing so, the sergeant told another gunner to sit down at the console.

It was then that we asked Guards Junior Sergeant Melkolyan to grade the student's work.

"He did well," Melkolyan answered after thinking a while, and not altogether confidently.

"Can you be more specific?"

Nothing specific followed in reply. It turned out that the section commander did not even know the combat standards or all of the criteria used to grade the exercise; rather than a lesson plan, all he had was some sketchy notes. Throughout the entire time at the training ground, he never sat down behind the sights, thus violating the main commandment of a teacher: "Explain, demonstrate and train."

Nor did the other sergeants of the company do any better. Many of the gunners failed to connect: Their bullets continued to fly by the targets, and precious time continued to slip away.

Finally, the fire training came to an end. It was now time to summarize the results. But there was nothing to summarize. On admission of Guards Senior Lieutenant Gorelyshev, the 3 hours of lessons at the training ground were wasted. Not one of the training goals indicated in the instructor's lesson plan was reached. Why? For several reasons, in my opinion. There was the unsatisfactory condition of the artillery school's training material base (the target field control program was not adequately monitored), there was the absence of radio communication, and there were not enough training places. But the main reason was the unpreparedness of the NCOs acting as instructors at the training stations. Not one of them possessed a lesson plan. The section commanders provided them with a vague idea as to what

they had to teach their subordinates. Their own skills with the armament, in target reconnaissance, in preparing the fire data and in correcting fire were poor, and finally, the methods they used in their instruction were not very sophisticated.

These shortcomings recurred in other fire training exercises, both day and night, particularly in the subunit commanded by Guards senior lieutenants A. Suvalov and V. Zotin.

The impression was created that no one was teaching the NCOs even the elementary teaching techniques. We questioned the NCOs about this.

"I have never been to an instructor training lesson," said Guards Junior Sergeant Shot', "I've only attended some briefings."

Similar statements followed from the other sergeants as well.

"I must admit that something went wrong with the instructor training lessons," confessed the battalion commander, Guards Major V. Tretyak. "We planned for them at the very beginning of the training year, but we never got to them. The same thing goes for commander lessons for the NCOs. We have not had a single lesson yet. We have not even been able to conduct the pre-winter instructor training rallies foreseen by the combat training program. And so the NCOs are just limping along: "They don't know much themselves, and what they do know, they can't transmit to their subordinates."

I could not keep from asking: "How did the battalion manage to forget such a highly important measure?"

"We couldn't squeeze out any time for rallies; we were up to our ears in other things: We had to spend most of our time getting the training material base ready for the new year," replied Guards Major Tretyak.

Many directives of various kinds were sent down from headquarters. But no one ever specifically gave permission, either orally or in writing, to cancel the instructor training rallies or the commander and instructor training lessons for the NCOs. And if that was true, then there is no one to hold responsible for the serious mistakes.

This discussion occurred at headquarters 3 days before the battalion was to conduct its next regular 2-day commander lessons for NCOs, with the participation of the company commanders and the chiefs of the regimental services.

"To be honest, there won't be any lessons—it would be practically impossible to hold them," the battalion commander sighed. "Look at what we have to do next week: Monday and Tuesday—fire training for the squads of all of the companies; Wednesday and Thursday—platoon fire training; Friday—l-day company tactical drill."

And in fact, the forthcoming week was quite full. But why did the commander lessons for NCOs have to be planned precisely in that week? This, it turns out, was a scheduling error by the regimental staff: The latter scheduled commander lessons for young commanders in the battalions on a unit-wide scale in the fourth week of each month.

I have before me the directives from higher headquarters. Here in black and white, it says that lessons for NCOs were to be scheduled at the beginning of each month. One would think that this requirement would be satisfied without question. But the regimental staff had its own opinion.

"Somehow we never gave much thought to the schedule, feeling that there was nothing to worry about," the regiment commander and chief of staff said to me.

But shouldn't it be clear to everyone that it is one thing to instruct the NCOs at the beginning of the month, and give them the knowledge they need before conducting lessons with the personnel, and quite another thing to do so at the end of the month, after the subunits have already gone through their training?

"And so we'll be doing everything backwards," Guards Major Tretyak summarized,
"We will return from fire training and then begin teaching the NCOs how to conduct
the fire training of their squads. If, of course, we even have commander
lessons...."

The regiment's officers said many things that made sense in the interview about the need for daily meticulous work with junior commanders, and about the importance of imparting knowledge and teaching skills to them systematically. But as we can see, after the right things are said, the right things are not always done. My partners in the conversation tried to explain away this situation by a lack of time and by an abundance of additional assignments from above. But this was not where the main reason lay for the lack of interest in commander and teacher training for NCOs. It lay in the irresponsibility of officials obligated to show concern for high quality training for junior commanders.

"We'll put things in order, we'll organize the strictest possible control," they hastened to assure us at regimental headquarters. "Inspector training lessons will be conducted on the most important subjects of tactical and fire training in many subunits today, right now."

And in fact, they were held that day. But in what manner? Hastily, without fore-thought. Not having a clear idea about instructor training lessons, their structure and their orientation, some subunit commanders conducted them as ordinary commander lessons—that is, all they did was arm the sergeants with a knowledge of the subject, and not with the art of teaching subordinates.

Incidentally, we did manage to witness one successful lesson with junior commanders. It was held on the following day, and it was conducted instructively, at a high methodological level by Guards Lieutenant I. Kuldanov. One had to see how confidently all of the sergeants, without exception, acted later on in the field tactical exercises. They competently commanded their subordinates, displaying initiative, and they managed to reach a high level of quality in training on a difficult subject.

What conclusion begs itself from all of this? We must decisively raise the quality of commander training afforded to NCOs, thoughtfully plan it, maintain proper control over it, achieve unfailing conduct of all lessons with this category

of servicemen at a high methodological level and do something which should have been done in the regiment long ago--set up special classrooms or rooms for independent study by junior commanders. The logic here is quite simple: The training a private recieves depends on the training a sergeant receives. In other words successful completion of combat training missions and military indoctrination of the personnel, and further improvement of the combat readiness of the subunits and units depend entirely on the junior commanders. Unfortunately, this truth was forgotten in the regiment.

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GROUND FORCES

COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 15

[Article by Senior Warrant Officer A. Volchanskiy, master of communication, Red Banner Turkistan Military District: "Antennas Above the Pass"]

[Text] Dawn met our column in the mountains as it was marching toward the pass. The pass was an important reference point to me--soon after it, the crew was to establish communication with a distant station.

A small plateau rising above the road was found to be the most convenient place for deploying the antenna field. There were no tall summits and ranges in the way of the station, and the nearby terrain was sufficiently open. This meant that radio waves emitted by the transmitting antenna and received by the receiving antenna would not experience reflections, pulsations or attenuations, which is often observed in the mountains.

The way up to the plateau turned out to be rather steep--the truck could not get up it head-on.

"Drive sideways up the slope," I ordered the driver-electrician, Private O. Dzhuman-ivazov, "and watch my signals carefully."

The problem was that there were rocks in the way. Walking in front of the truck, I gaged their height. In response to my signals, Dzhumaniyazov detoured around those which exceeded the clearance of the running gear. To keep the truck from slipping down if it became necessary to stop, privates S. Kandaurov and S. Khasbulatov stationed themselves beside the rear wheels holding wooden brake chocks, made before the exercise, at ready.

The ascent was soon behind us, and in a few dozen more meters the vehicle came to a halt. Armed with shovels and a pick, we leveled out an area for the truck and the gasoline-powered electric generator. Then we began deploying the radio station. And although we had to work on noticeably sloped terrain, we got the station running at the appointed time. This was owing to the good professional skills of the crewmembers—to a great extent the product of prior training conducted regularly with the specialists of the subunit on the training field.

The signal training field created at the unit's location allows crewmembers to do more than practice the purely special procedures of deploying a radio station and exchanging information with other stations. The young soldiers also learn to surmount mountain canyons, rocky descents and ascents, narrow passages and dried-out river channels, they acquire the necessary psychological maturity, and they improve their habits of accurate fire, camouflage and deception, position engineering and so on.

The quality of communication in the mountains depends in many ways on the choice of the location for deploying the radio station. In one of the lessons Sergeant S. Penkin's crew deployed the radio station in a canyon. There were good conditions for camouflage and for deployment of the antenna arrays. The soldiers worked diligently, but the quality of reception from many stations turned out to be low. Rearrangement of the different types of antennas did not made things any better. It was only after the location of the radio station was changed that the crew was able to achieve good results.

Such cases occur rather often in the mountains. This is why success depends directly on the ability of the radio station chief to correctly evaluate the surrounding terrain and account for its features. Not only the topography but also the nature of the ground itself must be considered. Many times in mountainous desert terrain I found it better to secure mast guy wires with angled stakes rather than round anchor pegs, since the former are easier to drive into the ground with a large boulder. Because such stakes are bent more easily by a sledge hammer, we made a few extra before the exercise.

Specific difficulties are often encountered when an antenna field is deployed in mountainous conditions. Limited space, depressions, rocks, brush and many other things require each crewmember to think and act independently and competently. In order to develop necessary habits in the young soldiers, I try to find different types of terrain each time we go out into the field to deploy the radio station. Whenever the topography changes, new problems arise.

Once when we were installing an antenna mast, there was a pit where one of the guy wires was supposed to be secured. Rather than lengthening the cable with extra wire foreseen for this purpose, Private R. Rybin moved the peg a few meters to the side. As we know, a mast is stable when the guy wires are stretched out at equal angles. Rybin violated this requirement: The angle between two of the guy wires was increased to almost 180°. I explained the mistake to the soldier, emphasizing that because of strong winds in the mountains, a mast secured in this fashion could collapse.

In another lesson acting crew chief Private V. Temerev decided to suspend the fabric of the receiving antenna above a mountain road: There was no suitable area nearby, he said. In his estimation, a truck could get by on the road without snagging the antenna's metal cable. But what if another type of equipment passed by?

Sergeant N. Pykhtin, who was conducting the lesson, corrected the young specialist. He showed him how, by lengthening the feeder between the station and the receiving antenna, he could deploy it higher up the slope.

The training field plays a significant role in developing work habits at night. We begin night lessons on familiar terrain.

For example Sergeant Penkin's crew satisfied the daytime radio station deployment standard with a grade of "excellent." But the first time a lesson was conducted at night, deliberately when the moon was full, the signalmen were unable to reach even "satisfactory."

The young specialists ran up many extra minutes while deploying the antenna arrays due to "little things." Thus, they did not lay out the components of the antenna mast in the required order beforehand. And when this is not done, the subsequent work cannot proceed automatically.

Private N. Bobkov wasted a great deal of time searching for a peg he had pounded into the ground himself, because he had failed to tie the end of the cable to it right away. I went through the mistakes made by each crewmember with equal care.

During the next night lesson the signalmen no longer made any gross errors. After reinforcing their work habits in darkness during other training sessions, they began to act faultlessly, satisfying the standard.

When radio stations are used in the mountains, the apparatus experiences greater vibration during travel. We take special account of this during exercises and special tactical lessons. In the evening before, I carefully check the fastenings of the instruments and blocks, and the tightness of high-frequency plug connections and mechanical joints. After a march, before deploying the radio station the first thing I do is to once again check the mechanical fasteners to make sure that there is no free play in them. The transmitter, which is the most massive piece of equipment, gets priority attention in this regard.

In the mountains, a radio station crew must often act independently, apart from the main forces. Under such conditions the technical knowledge and habits, the psychological maturity and the physical fitness acquired on the training field help—the specialists to the utmost.

Practice shows that an integrated approach to signalman training is especially effective in mountainous conditions.

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GROUND FORCES

ATGM TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 4

[Article by Senior Lieutenant Yu. Chura, commander, PTUR platoon, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Tanks in the Sights"]

[Text] The PTUR [tank guided rocket] combat vehicles raced swiftly along the training ground's well-traveled road, when suddenly, not more than 15 minutes from their point of rendezvous: "Tanks on the left. Action!" Time compressed into a tight spring, and the count proceeded in seconds.

The first projectiles left the guides with a sharp whine. Almost simultaneously, there were three flashes in the vicinity of the targets. Three tanks gone! Another three launches, and three more tanks were struck. And so all six were struck with the first attempt.

Excellent! This was the grade Army General M. Zaytsev, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, gave to the tactical fire skills of the battery's personnel. Attending this tactical exercise, which included field firing as one of its phases, he rewarded the combat vehicle commanders of our platoon who had distinguished themselves the most--sergeants Vasiliy Shushmarkin and Anatoliy Shimchenko.

Because armor protection and armament are growing stronger and because the maneuverability of tanks is rising, it is becoming much more difficult to combat them, and the tactics employed with combat equipment must be constantly improved. The maximum shooting ranges of tanks and PTURs are about equal. But tanks have a greater rate of fire. On the other hand, however, PTURs enjoy a significantly greater probability of kill. The conclusion begs itself: We must capitalize on this advantage, mainly by making each launch count. How can we make each launch count?

There are several basic factors I would single out here. First of all, there is perfect knowledge of the combat equipment on the part of each specialist.

I remember two disappointing incidents that occurred with the platoon. Driveroperator Private A. Klyuchenya failed to completely close a hatch during one of
the field firing exercises. As a result an arresting mechanism failed to disengage,
and the projectile never left its guide. Another time, vehicle commander Sergeant
N. (I will not give his name, because he is now a top-class specialist) failed to
set the projectile completely on its guide when loading the unit.

I began analyzing the causes. I found that the men did not have a sufficient idea about the essence of physical processes occurring in the apparatus.

It was then that significant changes were made in the training methods: We made use of training materiel mandatory in all lessons.

Each lesson ended with a competition: Who could make a launcher ready, and detect and eliminate a deliberately created fault the fastest?

Let me note that this approach to combat training required deeper knowledge and firm habits of me as well. I had to do a great deal of extra study, and I had to do some training in the combat vehicle. The training exercises were made more intensive for the specialists. The men began to show an interest in the equipment, and they tried to learn it thoroughly.

No matter what they did, at the start of the training year the crews could not satisfy the combat standard for an outstanding grade in loading. Their perpetual excuse was that it was supposedly too hard. And in fact, the standard was not one of the easier ones to satisfy. But how could the soldiers and sergeants be persuaded that it could be satisfied by any well-trained specialist?

The battery commander and I decided to demonstrate to the platoon's personnel that this standard could in fact be satisfied. Of course, we did have to sweat a little, but we satisfied the standard for an outstanding grade with 30 percent of the time to spare. There were no doubters after this, and the soldiers and sergeants made an effort to achieve the same results.

Standards generally play an exceptionally important role in the operator training system. It is no accident that they are referred to as exact indicators of soldier proficiency. This is precisely why satisfaction of standards is an ever-present element in the training exercises for the platoon's personnel. For example, before taking his place in a trainer, the student must either load a launcher, or run 100 meters with a box of projectiles, or do 30 squats with a 72-pound weight. once again in satisfaction of a standard, he must prepare for launching and aim the launcher on the target. Thus the conditions of the training exercises are made as similar as possible to those in which tank destroyers would have to act in real combat--under enemy fire and in the face of mass destruction weapons. Test exercises with the battery demonstrated that not everyone is prepared for such trials. Thus because of an incompetent choice of a fire position the commander of one of the combat vehicles was unable to deliver a projectile to its target: Ramming into a small hill, the antitank rocket blew up several hundred meters from the practice target. A decision was made to make the conditions of the training exercises more difficult by including several standards, aimed at raising fire accuracy, in addition to the training missions themselves. Thus a projectile is usually locked onto a target when it is 400-700 meters away. But experience showed that in the dynamics of lessons or exercises, it is difficult to determine this distance, since the operator's attention is concentrated on something else. It was found much easier and more dependable to do this 3-4 seconds before the projectile met its target.

It was also recommended that when a projectile is launched against a tank on level terrain at medium and long range, the projectile should be kept two or three times higher than the target. Otherwise the projectile blocks out the view of the target, and this reduces aiming accuracy.

The soldiers and sergeants reinforced and improved their knowledge and habits during lessons in a trainer. It was designed by Major N. Sprut, who also took charge of its manufacture. The trainer consists of several portable units. It can be set up in any combat vehicle. Every crewmember is then able to train at his own combat post. The training situation was made uncontrived as possible. As a result we spend twice less time on operator training than before.

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GROUND FORCES

BOOK REVIEW: THE SOVIET GROUND FORCES

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[Review of book "Sovetskiye Sukhnoputnyye" [The Soviet Ground Forces] by Colonel General Kh. Ambaryan, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1981, 254 pages, price 1 ruble, 10 kopecks: "Always On Guard"]

[Text] Almost four decades have passed since the last volleys of the Great Patriotic War were heard. During this time our country not only healed the wounds of war but also made a colossal leap forward in its economic and social development. The peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people is being dependably protected by our valorous armed forces, fostered by the Communist Party.

The ground troops are an inseparable part of the Soviet Armed Forces. They have always had the main role in the important missions given by the party and government to the Soviet Army and Navy with the purpose of armed defense of the socialist fatherland and the state interests of the Soviet Union. It is to them, our glorious ground troops, that a new book published by the Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "The Soviet Ground Forces," is dedicated. The book consists of essays and articles written by Soviet military leaders, commanders, political workers and journalists. Published on the eve of a holiday—Soviet Army and Navy Day, it was a good gift to the soldiers, and especially the young ones attending the school of life, the school of endurance and discipline in the army and navy. The book traces the glorious road of combat followed by our valorous ground troops throughout the entire history of their existence, and it demonstrates how they grew stronger in numerous battles for the honor, liberty and independence of our motherland, and in the performance of their international duty.

"The ground troops of today," we read in the introductory article written by the commander in chief of the ground troops, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Army General V. Petrov, "consist of modern missiles, powerful artillery, formidable tanks and fast combat vehicles. In former times, however, they were simply referred to as the infantry." The commander in chief describes the evolution of this branch of troops, which has become the largest arm of service and the most diverse in armament and equipment, capable of executing major strategic missions with the purpose of defeating the enemy both in coordination with other arms and independently. "The soldiers of the ground troops," Army General V. Petrov writes in the conclusion of his article, "who are inspired by the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, vow to their dear party and people that they will always be on guard, at their battle stations, always prepared to fulfill their patriotic and international duty with honor and merit."

The article "Sons Faithful to the Fatherland," written by Colonel General M. Popkov, a member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Troops, discusses the high energy and political morale which reign in units and formations of the ground troops in connection with the implementation of the 26th CPSU Congress's historic plans. It also discusses the concrete contribution being made to this noble cause by communists and Komsomol members, and the daily increase in the intensity of the socialist competition of the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan. "In garrisons both near and far," writes Colonel General M. Popkov, "from the western borders to the Pacific Ocean, from the Arctic to Kushka, the military labor of the motherland's defenders merges with the selfless effort of all Soviet people to implement the great plans of commmunist construction outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress."

Structurally the book "The Soviet Ground Forces" consists of eight sections. The first is devoted to the glorious motorized rifle troops. It begins with an article by Colonel General M. Khomulo. Using specific figures and facts, the author shows how the "earth mother of infantry" has changed beyond recognition owing to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, under the party's guidance, to improve and equip all of the armed services, including motorized rifle units. "Today," writes Colonel General M. Khomulo, "we have no infantry in the way that it used to be defined before; instead, what we have are the motorized rifle troops, which are the foundation of the ground troops and the core of their combat formations."

A brief interview with Hero of Socialist Labor, twice-awarded State Prize Laureate, RSFSR Distinguished Inventor S. G. Simonov considers the development of infantry armament, in which he had taken a direct part. Then follows a series of essays and articles on the people of the motorized rifle units, on their heroism at the front in the struggle against the fascist German invaders and on how much the present soldiers of the motorized rifle units treasure the combat traditions of the war heroes. Essays which in my opinion will doubtlessly interest the readers include "I Commanded a Company..." (author--Hero of the Soviet Union V. Karpov), "The Goddess of Victory Lives on Earth," "The Field--The Academy" (authors V. Verstakov and Colonel A. Sgibnev) and the other materials of the first section.

"The tank troops.... They are called the shield of armor of the motherland, the main strike force of the ground troops," writes Colonel General Yu. Potapov, whose article begins the second section of the book under review here. "There can be no argument about this, because the modern tank troops are a mighty resource of armed conflict, and they are intended for the most important missions in different forms of combat."

The firepower of the ground troops has risen immeasurably as well. Today, as Marshal of Artillery G. Peredel'skiy writes in the collection, this power consists mainly of "operational-tactical and tactical missiles capable of accurately and dependably delivering nuclear warheads to any target located within their range." These powerful weapons are in dependable hands.

And so in one section after another, the heroic history of all branches of troops unfolds: artillery, air defense, engineer troops, chemical troops and signal troops. And each page of the book brings alive the intense daily training of the present

generation of Soviet soldiers, who have accepted the baton from their fathers and grandfathers—heroes of the Great Patriotic War. "They have not experienced the severe trials that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev from the tribunal of the 26th CPSU Congress. "But they are faithful to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And in every case where the interests of the country's security and protection of the peace require, whenever the sacrifices of aggression need help, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a disinterested and courageous patriot and an internationalist, prepared to surmount all difficulties."

The authors and compilers of this collection clearly and eloquently demonstrated this on the pages of the book "The Soviet Ground Forces," which cannot but stir the hearts of both graying war veterans and the beardless young who have yet to take their place in the ranks of the motherland's armed defenders. It is mainly here that the value of this new book about the army lies. It will doubtlessly assume an important place in the array of ideological resources for indoctrinating our glorious young.

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NAVAL FORCES

SURFACE VESSELS: TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Camouflage Exercise Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Jan 82 p 1

[Article by Capt-2d Rank S. Bystrov (Mediterranean Sea--received by radio): "And the Ship Became Invisible"]

[Text] There are the boundless smoothness of the Mediterranean Sea, the high clear sky, and the sun. Even in the sapphire-blue water, visibility reaches tens of meters, and on the sea's surface, as they say, visibility is absolute. But the escort-ship commander faces a problem that at first glance is impossible in this absolute daylight clarity: to provide reliable concealment of the ship, to make it invisible. Really, like in the story about the cap of darkness. For navy men, this tale has long since become reality. Each ship now has on board these days a "cap of darkness": a reliable means of modern camouflage. The whole essence lies in knowing how to use it in time.

The training-alert signal sounds. The sailors take up their battle stations. What has happened? What has happened is that the ship's radar has detected aerial targets. They are getting progressively closer. There will be a battle. Everything aboard for repulsing an aerial attack has been brought up to combat readiness. A solitary ship at sea can rely only upon itself. And in this case the valor of the sailors lies not in crossing swords with the "enemy." The losses can prove to be too great. The task is to spoil a surprise blow. There are only a few minutes during which concealment techniques can be applied to deceive the "enemy."

An exercise during which he had been given the task of providing concealment for a formation in case an above-water "enemy" appeared was memorable to the ship's commander. They had gone several cablelengths ahead of the ships that were protecting an ASW cruiser. The main weapon in the forthcoming training engagement at that time was a smokescreen. That same smokescreen that was known long ago to sailors. During the Great Patriotic War our small-boat operators successfully used it during an attack on superior enemy forces. One of the best-prepared small boats rushed past an enemy convoy under squally fire, leaving behind an impenetrable belt of smoke, cutting the enemy off with a white wall, through which he could not aim fire at the torpedo boats. While the latter, flying out from behind the rescuing barrier, inflicted crushing blows. And then they disappeared again.

Smoke was an insurmountable obstacle for the optics. Radar was just gaining a foothold. But now again there is smoke during exercises. When an escort ship

lays a screen, the commander finds that he himself discerns the formation with difficulty. And the radar interference being used by the other ships practically dissolves the entire formation in space. So why not "dissolve" one ship at sea?

Reports about the targets followed, one after another. Then the barrels of weapons are aimed for an encounter with these targets. But Capt-3d Rank Yu. Bondarev still readies the means for delivering active and passive radar interference, which will cover the ship reliably.

The lighted indicator board at the station of senior engineer of the control department, Lt Kalendarev, looks like the keyboard of an organ. He determines the procedure for delivering interference in accordance with the situation.

And that is all. The photocameras for objective monitoring click. They give a picture of the "enemy" attack that is being interrupted. And though missiles and weapons barrels are still being aimed anxiously at the sky, this is only for insurance. But the danger has passed. And even if, in desperation, the airplanes take it into their heads to use weaponry, the weapon will not reach its target because the "enemy" does not see the ship.

The ship exercises went on successfully as a whole. But the commander emerged from the GKP [Main Control Post] discontented. There had been errors. Even if they were small ones. Perhaps the "enemy" did not even notice their ship. But can this be an excuse for those who want to win in battle these days?

The second month of the new training year is being completed. Crews at the bases are gradually adding complication to the exercises they work out. Is it worthwhile, against this background, to be put out because of small imprecisions in carrying out fairly complicated tasks on a long-range cruise? It is. And the commander is right: the sea requires high combat skill of sailors during any portion of the training year.

On the 'Bezukoriznennyy'

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by special correspondent Capt-Lt A. Tkachev: "The Flag of the 'Bezukoriz-nennyy'"]

[Text] The cinema screen was hanging on the gun barrels of a turret, hardly trembling in the wind, like a sail. Capt-3d Rank Rykov was occupying the commander's spot, the quarter-deck lights were switched off, and the motion-picture projector began to clatter. When darkness came, the air cooled off sharply and Yuriy Vladimirovich regretted that he had dispensed with his greatcoat. For by day it was hot. The signalmen had squinted as if it were summer. The Mediterranean Sea sparkled, lavishing splendor.

A thief of heat--December--took its own place at night.

"Comrade commander...!"

Well, now, the watch officer is asking the commander to come to the main command post. The usual story, thought Rykov, the better the film the less the prospects of seeing it to the end without interference.

The watch officer reported that the sonarman had heard noises on a bearing that would not provide assurance that this was a submarine, but in any case he had decided to disturb....

"The sonarman is hearing it right now?"

"No."

"Put the radar on high. Contact has been lost for a long time?"

!'About 5 minutes, comrade commander."

That was bad. The lieutenant had wasted too much time vacillating. A second mistake—the radar had not been turned on. But Rykov did not start to speak about it, for the time being. The lieutenant had just now been permitted to perform watch—officer responsibilities, and decisiveness comes with experience.

What is on the scope? Bright clutter—these are ships at anchor. Everything is in its place, and there are not too many of them. In view of the short duration of the contact, the sonarmen could, of course, have been mistaken. But it is not necessary to hurry. Rykov stands still over the radar's tube, listening while the lieutenant coughs and twiddles. He is upset, he is young....An odd one! Who right off....The thought stopped suddenly. A weak twinkle arose where the screen had been empty. So a periscope is coming to the surface....

"Put the duty officer on the phone," Rykov ordered and twirled a handle for measuring the distance to the target.

"'Tropik' is on the line, comrade commander," the watch officer reported, not in his own voice. The voice belonged to senior assistant, Capt-Lt Rimashevskiy, who handed Rykov the radiotelephone receiver. Where had he appeared from? That means that he senses the situation....

"Take a look."

Letting the watch officer stand at the tube, Rykov reported to "Tropik" that a submarine had appeared in the area of the ship's moorage.

"Prepare to weigh anchor."

I had heard about the "Bezukoriznennyy" escort ship even before I had trod its deck. The staff had told me about how accurately the escort had shot down a high-speed aerial target that was flying at a record low altitude. The situation precluded an accidental success.

They had spoken calmly about the firing on the ship, although the "Bezukoriznennyy" had been switched to it at the last moment, when another ship had just finished preparation for a complete plan...."The situation can be anything," said Rykov. "It is our job to provide for constant combat readiness."

"Tropik" had not given the all-clear. But the flag officer had given the order "not to work" the submarine. Consequently, this could not have been a training check, as Rykov had at first supposed.

The check had been real.

"On the credit side is the report, on the debit side is the missed film," Rykov summed it up, returning the telephone receiver to its place. "Watch officer! Why such unseemly gloom on your face? Or have you detected submarines a hundred times, and this bores you no end?"

"Not at all, comrade commander, it is the first time...."

"Now you're putting on airs. But if you report to me after watch what your certain faulty actions were, then I will declare my gratitude to you before the formation. And, so the senior assistant will not be talking to you too much about it—how about some chess. Adam Adamovich?"

After setting out the chessmen, Rykov concealed a pair of pawns behind his back and demanded, not without craftiness:

"What if I order you, Adam Adamovich, to moor the ship to the dock, and then a higher chief appears and say: 'Senior assistant! Step aside, I will dock it.' What would be your pleasure?"

"It stands to reason, it is not easy....What are you driving at?"

"At the fact that you yourself just now grabbed the radiotelephone when I had told the watch officer to call 'Tropik.!..' That's all! Now let's think about chess, otherwise you will not guess that the white pawn is in my left hand. Do you believe it?"

Rykov is in appearance a stern person, but this is precisely a case where the exterior is deceptive. It goes without saying that the job makes its impression. A commander's intonation, firmness of glance, decisiveness in giving orders—all these are present when matters of the service are being resolved. But in the ward-room he is an interesting conversationalist, with a sense of humor, who knows how to involve everyone in the conversation. And when crew members come to the commander with what are called personal questions, Rykov takes the concerns of others to heart, purely person—to—person. He has developed that capability that comes to a person with difficulty—the capability to understand a person's situation, to encourage, and to help.

But the commander is most demanding and uncompromising when the matter touches on the ship's combat readiness, its prestige, the honor of its flag.

...The heaving lines have already been thrown. The "Bezukoriznennyy" has gone with its stern to the dock, when suddenly the end of the anchor chain has slipped out of the hawse-hole and disappeared in the water. Then the officer in charge raised up and became angry: "How did you do such a disgraceful thing?" I will say, getting ahead of myself, that the anchor again darkens its place at the hawse-hole on the starboard side. The ship was not harmed. But there was confusion.

What had happened? The anchor had been let go too soon because of a visual error in judging by the officer in charge of the poop, who had reported the distance to the dock. This was the first thing. The navigator had not checked the truth of the report. That was the second. The fact that the length of anchor chain that had been paid out had not been reported to the command post. That was the third.

Before this, the "Bezukoriznennyy" had been mentioned only in a commendable light during the year. And Rykov was bitter about reporting the whole "bouquet" of patchwork. But he did not soften anything or try to put it in a better light. And he took the chief blame himself.

Misfortune spotlights behavior. He who falls under its brightness, he who falls into a panic....The party organization secretary at that time was Engr-Capt 3d Rank Martynov. Rykov spoke frankly with him.

"Some comrades tried to write off today's occurrence as accidental circumstances. With such a frame of mind we lost not only the anchor but also the capability for self-criticism. It is necessary, Nikolay Pavlovich, to think about the agenda of a party meeting, at which they are to talk...about the giddiness from success of some communists."

As for the senior assistant, Capt-Lt Rimashevskiy, I saw him at a moment when the officer was taking everything out of the chain locker on deck.

"I was inspecting the fastening," explained Adam Adamovich, brushing his hands with cleaning waste. "I swore at myself: I was getting ready to examine something in case of an increased load on the anchor chain. It is of no great intricacy."

Rimashevskiy began to explain his idea. I was thinking about the fact that both time and the authorities will forgive the mistakes that people are studying about.

A rumor had preceded the appearance of Rimashevskiy on the ship—the officer is capable but hot—headed, he does not control himself. This was confirmed when the "Bezukoriznennyy" was forced to stop at anchor by the mooring—swivel method. The mooring—swivel shackle would not lie down at all when needed, and Rimashevskiy all but lost his voice giving deck commands.

"It's chaos!"--Adam Adamovich seethed, even after the job had been completed. "For 2 hours we tormented ourself....It's a shame!"

The mooring swivel is an especially complicated method for dropping anchor. The necessity for it seldom arises, and history knows cases where a large ship had spent up to 24 hours anchoring by the mooring swivel method. And so it was for the first time on the "Bezukoriznennyy," which coped not at all badly, but Rykov himself was not satisfied with the picture of the fuss on deck, with the backbreaking need for commands and the boatswain's barge-hauler's yells.

"One thing is good," said Rimashevskiy, calming down. "The year can rest peacefully. Until the next swivel mooring."

"I'll not live a year through a rumpus like today's," said Rykov, shaking his head. "We have a voice, it turns out. There is no experience or proper organization. Let us make a test, Adam Adamovich, replace one thing by another. Unless we master the mooring swivel right now, we will not be able to stop at anchor."

"It is logical," agreed Rimashevskiy. "There cannot be a better example."

He went straight to the best thing: in a month the boatswain had made a swivel mooring on the anchor chain in 20-25 minutes.

Much water has flowed under the bridge since then. The senior assistant and the commander have for a long time now been reacting to events in similar fashion, and with almost a single intonation. Is this good? Apparently, yes. If some features of a commander are suddenly being manifested in the service touch of his subordinates, then there is one explanation for this: they are copying a commander whom they like.

This was evident in all clarity in the example of Engr-Capt 3d Rank Martynov, who had come to the ship simultaneously with Rykov, when the "Bezukoriznennyy" was still being finished at the yard. The commander and the engineer had a mutal understanding with half a word, which happens only with likeminded people.

Somehow the "Bezukoriznennyy" turned up in an oceanic fishing ground area of Soviet fishing-industry ships. The captain of a large refrigerator trawler, "Mys Arkticheskiy," turned to the navymen for help. The fuel hose had become caught on the bottom of the ship. Would it be possible to come to the rescue with a diver?

Rykov called Martynov and showed him the radiogram.

"How shall we answer, Nikolay Pavlovich?"

The situation was clear to the utmost. The regulations prohibit diving descents that are not supported by a decompression chamber. There was none on the "Bezu-koriznennyy," or, for that matter, on the trawler. But the commander would not let the mechanical engineer dismiss the matter, he wanted to hear from him the obvious: "No, we cannot do it."

"But where is their own rescue ship?" asked Martynov in order to clarify the situation.

"Some kind of a breakdown....It has gone temporarily to port."

"It turns out that there is no one but us....I am ready for work if the staff will give its permission. At the same time, we will have training for the divers."

As soon as the required authorization was received, a launch with divers set off from the "Bezukoriznennyy" for the "Mys Arkticheskiy." The divers were Smn Vladimir Os'makov and Viktor Solov'yev, who alternated in diving with aqualungs under the trawler's bottom, until they had sawed the knot by which the hose had wrapped itself fatally around the acoustic depth-finder's fairing. Martynov supervised the dives. The fishermen hung over the rails and watched to see whether a shark would emerge from the sapphire-smoke colored depths.

The trawler's captain enthusiastically thanked them for the assistance.

"I will now have days of fishing—this means hundreds of tons of fish for the people's table!"

The case received publicity throughout the whole industry. The demand for divers proved to be great. Rykov did not refuse the assistance:

"We travel in similar directions. The fishermen feed the country, we defend it."

It was not possible to extend essential assistance to just one trawler. The command could not understand why their ship, which had just undergone drydocking in a foreign port, would not get 3-4 knots while under way. The divers reported: the bottom was overgrown with a coral-and-shell mass, and a fine interbraiding had appeared out of nowhere in an unbroken armor.

On hearing this, the captain clutched his head: "The capitalists swindled us!" And he told how a contractor, in order to free the drydock more quickly, had promised to have divers clean the bottom. And the divers had swarmed around for a couple of days, and then, by means of a device for underwater observation, had shown clean bottom plating—that very same interbraiding....

"Today there were no dives, but something like political studies," reported Marty-nov to the commander. "In the sense of education in political maturity."

The "Bezukoriznennyy" had one predecessor—a destroyer of postwar construction with the same name on it. But it will still not be an exaggeration to assert that successors of front—liners are serving on the escort ship "Bezukoriznennyy." The relationship here is not only a blood one—a serviceman son and a father and grand—father wage war, although there are many such successors in the crew. But much more important is the spiritual relationship with the older generations, support for their behests, the development of their traditions. This is manifested primarily in an understanding of the state significance of their service, in the fervor of their attitudes toward the honor of the flag.

...Mediterranean nights will not be forgotten! Stunningly beautiful, and anxious and sleepless, like before battle. On such nights, Yuriy Vladimirovich raised his binoculars to his eyes, and in the glasses of the ground optics I saw colored points.

A NATO destroyer was following the "Bezukoriznennyy." Its navigation lights were reflected in the commander's binoculars. From night to night....

On the 'Kiev'

Moscow YUNOST' in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 26 Jan 82) pp 69-73

[Article by Nikolay Cherkashin: "Matters of Cruise Days"]

[Text] 1. "The Watch Had to Take Over in Good Order"

The deck was rocking and both ranks of the formation now rose on their toes, now rested on their heels. And Capt-3d Rank Viktor Zakharov still had the pistol of the ship's officer of the deck on his hip.

On the right flank the orchestra sparkled with its trumpets. Next stood the automation operators of the deck watch in helmets and peajackets, the guard, the patrol for the artillery and missile magazines, orderlies for the crew's quarters, the officers in charge of the watch stations, and other duty people for the daily detail.

Zakharov had just walked around the front with the new guard for the lower decks, checked the condition of the clothing and knowledge of the instructions, and, in a

concluding ritual, asked the almost rhetorical question: "If there is anyone who does not understand his assignment, raise your hand."

Of course no one raised his hand, except for the band leader, who raised his baton, readying the orchestra for the march. But Capt-3d Rank Zakharov had to speak about special vigilance during the current duty-at anchor in the open sea, at incredible distances from home shores. To speak in order to burn it through each person, even if he takes up his post for the 100th time.

Zakharov's father had served in the war on the Far East border. To speak, perhaps about all of them right now as being not simply a daily detail but a small border outpost that protects the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union--a naval ship?

A frigate of the NATO naval forces drifted two cablelengths from the "Kiev." Voluntarily or involuntarily, his guns looked at the backs of the sailors, who were standing still in ranks. And then Zakharov gave the command:

"About face!"

Both ranks turned, with their faces to the muzzles of the frigate's weapons. Zacharov named their calibers, rates of fire and the combat capability of the guided missiles.

"Our main task is to provide not only for internal order but also for the safety of the anchorage. The highest combat readiness for the cruiser."

Eyes looked sternly from under the steel helmets' visors, the gold-browed sailor hats, the black forage caps.

"Attention! Band, play 'Assembly!"

A fine march burst out. The formation stayed in step with precision on the unstable deck, marching past the officer of the deck, past the big scarlet star on a helicopter stabilizer, past the turrets of the foreign frigate....And there was in this procession an echo of that far-off November parade, from which the troops had gone into battle.

Life aboard a ship is a copy of life in a big city. Cities in an eternal stage of siege. At any minute of a cruise, even if at anchor or moored, the ship should be ready to repulse an attack from the air, from under the water, or from beyond the horizon. The ship's officer of the deck knows what he has to do and what the others have to do if the cruiser is suddenly subjected to attack by a low-flying airplane or by a missile, or torpedo boats, or submarines taking up an attack.

A black screen, behind which is a drawing of the "Kiev" in cross-section, is a sharp reminder about what Capt-3d Rank Zakharov was speaking right now--if damage occurs, first, who will begin the struggle for damage control. It stands to reason that for this purpose it is necessary to know to perfection the whole multipledeck labyrinth of corridors, watertight compartments, and the fuel tank, and to sort out the intricate systems for firefighting, drainage, sprinkling and illumination.

Zakharov walks about the ship. It is impossible to go about the whole ship, even if the guard personnel walked the endless corridors and dove into the bottomless depths every day.

Hot handrails lead into the engine and boiler room. The officer of the deck will begin his selective inspection here today.

On catching sight of the officer with the blue-and-white band on his jacket, the officers in charge of the watch stations tighten up and introduce themselves smartly, drowning out the noise of the operating machinery. Zakharov questions the watch officers for the middle decks, the combustion activity, and the power plant. He asks each of them one question: "Your actions in case outside water breaks in?" The answers are precise and assured. The sailors feel that the officer of the deck is satisfied by them, but then why does he write down their last names in a notepad?

But Zakharov bombards them with new questions: "Where does this main lead to? What does this pump feed?" No, this is no longer a check; Zakharov himself is studying, not missing opportunities to find out something new about the ship on every convenient occasion.

There are two categories of duty personnel on the ship. Some try to report to the commander at the morning operational meeting with remarks that are as voluminous as possible, showing off their thoroughness —the commander usually makes a wry face and requires a report on the essence. Capt—3d Rank Zakharov is one of those who know how to single out the important and not be afraid of suspicion that what he says is baseless, reporting the fact that he has no comments. As for the trifles, long ago it was pointed out who would be able to eliminate them quickly.

Today, at the end of the report, he gave the last names of those machine operators who had distinguished themselves, and the commander approvingly nodded his head. In the evening their names were announced in the ship's radionewspaper.

It was not a great event. But these lines are Capt-3d Rank Zakharov's style of service. Indeed, not every officer who, having turned his authority over to the officer of the deck, goes to the editor's cabin in order to name the best on shift.

... The duty was not the most bothersome. But neither was it the most peaceful.... At 0300 the phone rang in the deckhouse:

"In an hour and a half a helicopter will bring a gravely ill person to the ship. Provide for its reception."

Zakharov announced readiness No 1 to BCh-6* and to the medical service. He went out onto the flight deck. He watched while the helicopter landed, while the stretcher was brought out, a black greatcoat on top of the blanket, and while they were taken carefully to the operating room....

...In the morning the ship lifted anchor, and Zakharov was called to the bridge, where he had to exchange his pistol for a dirk, and the band of the cruiser's officer of the deck for the red-and-white crossband of the watch officer.

^{*}BCh-6--the ship's aviation department.

Each time the "Kiev" faces a complicated maneuver, the cruiser's best watch officer and Capt-3d Rank Viktor Zakharov are called to the pilothouse. So it was during the passage of many narrows, and so it was also during the forced crossing of a last channel....Today the matter was no less complicated.

"Prepare the ship to receive fuel while under way by the beam method!" Zakharov's voice resounded over the ship's intercom.

The cruiser and tanker were coming together, side to side, and hoses were thrown.

"Transfer fuel!"

Two large ASW ships approached the tanker and also joined up with it by hoses—from the stern and from the free side. The four ships made up an enormous floating island, and four stems were cutting the ocean waves. All parts of it were connected only by a shaky cable road and the commander's eyeballing.

"Half a degree to the right!" Capt-1st Rank Yu. Sokolov stands with a microphone on the starboard wing of the bridge. From here the distance between the ships' sides is visible. "Hold...trim one turn!"

Zakharov repeated the commands to the helmsman and the watch officer in the engine and boiler room. In a minute:

"A degree to the left. Hold...trim two turns!"

The ships are traveling hawse-hole to hawse-hole, and so reporting is done in degrees and turns. The watch officer right now is a bundle of nerves. The commands are monotones—"a degree to the right, a degree to the left." The slightest error, even a simple slip, is fraught with harm. And it is still necessary here to govern the ship's interior life, to respond quickly to all possible situations, and to guess them in advance. Zakharov is concentration itself. In the short pauses between commands he loses not a second:

"BIP [Combat Information Center], how is the horizon?"

"The horizon is clear."

"Navigator, the schedule of wind and pressures?"

"The wind has a tendency to strengthen. The atmospheric pressure is falling...."

"The bugler on deck. To the command, anyone not engaged in the fueling, eat!"

"PEZh [Power-Engineering and Damage-Control Center], report how many tons have been received!"

"Navigator, the time of sunset. Light the signal lights: 'I cannot get out of the way.'"

An airplane approached without identifying signs. Who is that? What does he want? It is reported to the commander. The airplane has turned—he has gone toward the coast. And here is a new worry: the running lights of an ocean liner have appeared ahead.

"Comrade commander, so that we may separate in 20 minutes by the port sides...,"
Zakharov reports the computed data of the combat information center.

And all this quickly, without superfluous movement, without reminders. One would think that Zakharov had rehearsed the whole operation earlier. It is not only interesting to observe his work, you will like him, as you would like the mastery of any virtuoso.

"Zakharov, you are not tired?"

"Not at all, comrade commander."

"Get tired--say it. Let's stop the refueling."

The joke was light, but it also relieved the nervous tension: everyone in the pilothouse was smiling.

And now the access holes of the tanks had been screwed on and the loading lines had been cast off. Capt-1st Rank Solokov turned from the bridge to the pilothouse, fell silent, and vigorously shook the watch officer's hand.

Strange as it may seem, Zakharov is not on the whole a representative of the basic nautical officer profession. He is by profession a chief of the chemical service. The talent of the seaman, like every other one, is given to a person without consideration of his staff assignment. Moreover, Zakharov came to the "Kiev" from the missile cruiser "Groznyy." And this is a school for commanders of generally recognized fame. It is there that Zakharov found out the truth of high nautical sophistication.

What more is there to say about Capt-3d Rank Zakharov?

He is a Knight of the Order for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces. He is an adherent of the rule of Admiral T. Butakov: "Each naval officer should be the best sailor and the best boatswain of his ship, so that he will have the moral right to require his subordinates to follow his own example in everything that he has to do."

... The call for all hands was hurriedly sounded. The one-pood links of the anchor chain are drawn in through the hawse-hole.

"Bugler on deck!"

The ASW cruiser "Kiev" leaves for other seas.

2. An Airplane Landing

The sky above the ocean is criss-crossed obliquely by white airplane contrails-just like a St. Andrew's flag.

It is the flight deck of the ASW cruiser "Kiev." The airplanes are of the vertical take-off type. Here is one of them--a bright-blue needle-nosed rocket plane-it is being rolled out onto the pad, which has been scorched by jet flames.

The fierce roar of the vectored-thrust engines pierces the ears. The airplane, as if it is a flying May beetle, is lifted slightly on fire-stream pillars. There is an instant of strained howling—the wheels separate from the deck; the vehicle uncertainly—the wheels need something solid—after swinging and shaking, the nose yawing, rises ever higher and higher and, finally, hangs at the height of a grown man, filling the whole vicinity with rocket thunder.

There is something entirely unaccustomed, surrealistic about the airplane, which is "frozen" in the air. All your past experience says that this cannot be. It is even a wee bit ridiculous, like Chukovskiy's, "fish taking a walk about the fields, toads flying about the sky...." But here an airplane flies along the deck, flying across its rim and, gathering speed each second, departs, flies away, and is carried off, drawing in its flaps and undercarriage....

This is how they fly away and this is how they land, the airplanes of the ship's aviation complement—without a takeoff roll! But once a jet aircraft had to land in the small area of the deck—and to land, keeping its "run" in mere tens of paces! The case was unprecedented, even the specialists did not believe it.

And it was like this: a difficulty arose for Maj Glushko in the sky above the ocean. The pilot was supposed to eject but decided to save the vehicle and he brought it...to the ship. The pilot—Maj Glushko, Vasiliy Petrovich—was born in 1951 and is a pilot 2d class.

It can now be added to this questionnaire-type data that Glushko is curly-haired, has brown eyes, is sociable by nature, and is by birth from the Zaporozh'ye Cossacks.

He and I are sitting in the crew's quarters, and the specialists are at present setting up the videotaping machine with a recording of the landing. Vasiliy says:

"We were flying in a group. The firing had gone normally. I was to be the third to land. But right then, because of exhaustion of fuel reserves, in the vicinity of a snow squall, I had to make some kind of a decision. I reported to the flight control officer. Of course, had the shore been closer, it would have been possible to land at an alternate airfield. But here is the ocean. One must jump. As always, NATO reconnaissance planes were flying around the area. This anger overcame me: to go tumbling in the eyes of the foe! He will take a picture of everything: the airplane falling into the water, the pilot being recovered.... Well, no! I felt that I would land. I do not know how, but I will land. There was that confidence. The old pilots taught this: make a decision and carry it through to the end. If you begin to rush about you will perish.

"It was decided, and at once my thoughts came as if on an indicator board: 'touch down on the deck close to the stern,' 'drop the turns,' and 'brakes.'

"Ours had all landed. They had not had time to put the airplanes below—they had pulled them aside, closer to the superstructure. I take up a landing glide path. The stern comes closer and closer. Groups had formed...."

In the crew's quarters, the television had started to operate, and on the screen the star-shaped front of an airplane coming in for a landing appeared. It tore along toward the operator at enormous speed. Here is the break of the stern. He is flying at the height of a grown man. There is a sharp biting. The airplane barely touches the nose to the deck, it leaps up, flops down and suddenly veers to the

right, straight for a plane that had been pushed up against the superstructure. In it sits a pilot who has not had time to get out of the cockpit. Glushko jerks the pedals and miraculously turns to the side. The tires were smoking, the brakes were frozen. The airplane skidded, grinding the deck with its deadly speed. It stopped something like a meter from the wing of a neighboring airplane. It is good that the outer wing panel had been raised for hangaring....

And stillness fell on the ship.

The first to run to the airplane was technician Sr-Lt Sergey Glushakov. It is important to note that the machine was smoking slightly--who knows how an engine will behave after such a landing? It was later clarified that the tires were doing the smoking, but then Sergey, without thinking, rushed to the pilot, flew up the steps and moved the canopy back.

"Fine fellow!" was all he shouted to Glushko, and he helped him to free himself from the harness. Staggering, Vasiliy went into the crew's quarters, where a vice-admiral who had observed the landing had already come down.

"Comrade vice-admiral...."

The old sailor interrupted the report with a strong embrace. Then friends surrounded him, congratulated him, shook hands, and someone required that an explanatory memorandum be written.

"Wait, give me time to eat!" said Glushko, waving them away. But he did not start to eat—he drank only a glass of stewed fruit....

On that confused day, another person who had shared to a certain extent with Glush-ko the risk and success of the landing—the flight control officer, Major Kolisni-chenko—had somehow been forgotten. An officer who is, to put it mildly, most careful, he had protested the pilot's decision, and prohibited the wild experiment—whatever you do, don't lose a valuable airplane. But Kolisnichenko himself, who is not considered an ace of shipboard aviation for no reason and has come out more than once with honor from a difficult situation, trusted his compatriot: "Glushko—land it!"

When there are many aircraft in the air, the flight control officer (RP) has to work with the precision of a juggler. Before his eyes is a radar screen with a scattering of marks; in his ears is a chorus of reports and requests. Moreover, someone has broken in on the operating wavelength with jazz, and in all this din it was necessary right off to see visibly how the landing will be made....

In the ether, the finale of the operation looked like this:

RP: 423, be calm. We will land you....Distance?

423 (Glushko's call sign): Distance...kilometers.

RP: Check your speed....Hold the rudder!

423: I am holding.

RP: 423, check the speed!

RP: The speed, 423.

RP: Maintain the vertical. The vertical!...

Glushko did not answer: he was already riding on the deck.

RP: Brakes! Brakes, 423!...Switch off the engine!

The uniqueness of the landing was that it had taken place not on an aircraft carrier but on an ASW cruiser, the flight deck of which is by no means a landing run-way—there is room enough only for helicopters and vertical—takeoff airplanes to take off and make vertical landings. No one in the world had landed like this. And, it goes without saying, this landing will be entered in aviation history in the name of the pilot, like the Nesterov loop, the Artseulov corkscrew....

Afterwards they were amazed: "If he had touched the deck just a bit later...,"
"if the pilot of the nearby aircraft had not had time to raise the outer wing panel...."
But all these contingencies, from which the success of the improbable landing took shape, were permeated by one consistent feature—the crew's skill.

A portrait of Zhukovskiy, "the father of Russian aviation," was hung in Glushko's cabin, and a calender of "The 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Kulikov," and Stasik's drawing, "Papa Takes Off from a Ship." Not long prior to the cruise a second son had been born—Vasil' Vasilich. On New Year's Day, Lyudmila had given (sent previously to the zampolit [deputy commander for political affairs]) theatrical binoculars and a jar of whortleberry jam. The thought of the first gift: what is a sailor without binoculars?—and a hint: let's go to the theater more often. The meaning of the second—eat whortleberry, it sharpens the vision, that is, keep your eyes open and be careful.

Glushko make his memorable landing on his birthday--14 January. Someone said: "He was born lucky, with his shirt on."

"With a sailor's striped vest," Glushko corrected him.

While these lines were being written, a message had arrived: for courage and cool-headedness shown during a landing under special conditions, Maj Vasiliy Glushko had been awarded the Order of the Red Star.

3. How Moods Are Born

The turrets of the cruiser's main battery were being readied for volleys, like a city for which an earthquake has been forecast: in the crew's quarters the light-globe shades were taken down and stored on cots, the instrument men for the state-rooms installed protectors for the porthole glasses, mirrors and clocks were taken down from the walls, the aquarium in the wardroom salon was placed on a soft divan, and braided mats were shoved under the feet of the piano, to keep it from going out of tune.

Lt Sergey Chernetsov took the storehouse lock down from the turret. The heavy plate of the armored door was rolled aside with an oily rumbling. The semidarkness

of the steely tightness reeked of fresh paint, oil and dampness. It seems that there is nothing more solid under one's feet than the armored floor of a turret, but the weight itself of the body suddenly began to be shifted from heel to toe--it was rocking. The steel floor was out of the earth, separated from it by an unsteady layer of water.

The test alert was sounded, and Chernetsov instinctively clicked his stopwatch. PO 1st Class Ivan Fedonyuk ran up to him with the key to the turret, which was no longer needed, and next—but within the time limit of the standards—Smn Grigoriy Zozulya.

The breech-block operators, girded with canvas ammunition containers and fuzes, unrolled the firing mechanisms from clean rags and attached them to the firing locks. Everything was as usual, as in training exercises. The charge cylinders had just jumped out of small hatches to the floor with a light sound, and they were laid on a tray, and because of this there were disquiet and discomfort in the turret.

Chernetsov sat down at the periscope of the officer-in-charge, rubbed the eyepieces with a chamois--the deserted sea began to ripple in the circular glasses. Look or don't look, but you do not catch sight of the targets. They are there, beyond the horizon; the artillery radars probe for them and, rapidly, silently and precisely, they issue a target designator to the turret. A cold drop plopped directly behind the doors; someone was wiping dry the overhead above the lieutenant's head, which was covered with moisture. Smn V. Dragan was busily going about with rags, drying off the steel of the port section. "And what's peculiar?" he said to everyone in sight. "I am wiping the whole section, above your head too, to leave no fault in the job."

"Take the target designator!...Aim!...at the target!...The projectile!..." the fire director's voice thundered over the speaker. From the bridge one can now see the barrels of the bow turrets, spread wide, go up and down. But now they are even with each other, in a line, and they have been elevated steeply. The turrets can scarcely slew on the barbet*, without taking the muzzle from the true bearing over which the charges are about to rush toward the targets. Gyroscopes help to hold this bearing in counterbalance with the rolling; the guns motionlessly fix their gaze on the horizon, as the enormous cruiser unhurriedly rolls on a wave. Right now there is no machine on the ship more important than the weapons, and that is why they alone are freed of rolling.

There is a fiery flash, overcoming the patches of sunlight, that traverses the superstructure.

"P-p-khaf-f!"

The roar, compressed severalfold, rent the air, the flame scorched the grease in the bores, and a shaggy red-brown cloud, torn from the muzzles by the wind, leaped higher than the mast. There are no words in the Russian language that will represent the hellish explosion, for there are no such sounds in nature. It is as if a beater aimed at a big drum misses the mark and the blow goes straight to a membrane in the ears.

^{*}The turret foundation.

Chernetsov twisted his forage cap to the back of his head—this is it, the starting shot!—excitement boils in his blood: a first will be named among the four turret commanders. And if it is not he, not Chernetsov—then fate will be permitting a scandalous injustice. Who else, who but he, made his gunners sweat blood? See how they twirl the locking mechanisms, see how the officers in charge of the weapons tense up, see how they have become attached to their handwheels.

Chernetsov suddenly would have liked to have his family and all his Leningrad acquaintances see him now in the turret—a dashing master of powerful mechanisms. He did not have time to be ashamed of himself for this foppish wish—the speaker roared:

"Load weapons!"

The breech-block operators put fuzes into the firing locks. And now a heavy striped service projectile dove into the receiving tube of the hoist with a light rumbling.

The mechanical music was performed as fast as lightning, almost without human participation. The "bundle" itself of gunpowder rods jumped out from under the floor and lay on the tray. It is difficult to believe that all these one-pood pieces will be transmuted into nothing in a split second, into smoke, into gases....

The block of the breech ring, the size of a steam hammer, is raised up with unexpected friskiness to the loading angle. Zozulya, who ramrods, quickly pulls the handle from the orifice—which hissed with compressed air—and the ribbed, rounded bulk of the breechblock flies up. Patches of sunlight that penetrate the barrel shimmer weakly on the breech chamber walls.

The officer in charge of the weapon cockily fills up the tube, and the black bony arm of the rammer, which jumped out suddenly from somewhere from the bowels of the firing mechanism, drives the charge into the oily darkness of the charge throat with a cloth fist. The "arm" disappears with the rapidity of a snake's tongue. In an instant, right after the charge, Zozulya inserts a white cylinder on a tray shoving his arms into the ribbed jaws up to his elbows. With an avaricious hissing, the fat upper "lip"—the locking piston—is lowered.

"The first weapon is ready for battle."

In all these seconds, everything--one movement right after another--was repeated in the other sections of the turret.

"The second weapon....The third weapon is ready for battle!"

"The second turret is ready for battle!" yells Chernetsov, so loud that the telephone operator does not have to repeat it; the men in the TsAP, the central artillery post, heard it at their positions.

"Aye, aye, sir," responds the speaker.

Now everyone is awaiting the shot. More precisely, the commands. Why does it take so long? Can it be that the speaker has malfunctioned? Or these gunlayers cannot take aim at all?

Rammer Zozulya cautiously takes a look at the charged breech ring: how far back will it recoil? Today he is firing live ammunition for the first time in his life. They say you must open your mouth in order not to be deafened.

Zozulya's anxious glance wandered about the turret's white walls, running from the fire extinguisher gripped by clips to the solid-shot shells of the training charges, from the indoor racks for gas masks, which are absurd here, to a closet where cigarettes, candles and cigarette lighters are stored when the turret is entered.

"Ready!...The bell!...."

With a short clang the breech ring is pulled, the floor shakes under one's feet. There is the rotten stench of burned gunpowder...."Is that all?"--Zozulya does not believe it. Behind the solid armor the shot is hardly heard. But from the volley of the main guns the clapper of the ship's 100-pood noon bell and the cord of the bell in the admiral's salon rocked, and the navigator's chronometer and the green fans of the tubbed palms in the captain's stateroom bobbed up and down, on springs.

"Load!"

The bow turrets were beating the fleeting targets into defeat. The loaders were raging beside the firing locks. Ready! Firing bell! Volley! Recoil! Ready! Firing bell! Volley! Recoil! Hiss! Clang! Roar!

Chernetsov is a bundle of entreaty and hope: if only I do not run out of speed! So far he hasn't missed a thing! Phooey, phooey, phooey!....If only they do not let me down. Zozulya is a good fellow! Like an automaton. On his day off! Brothers! You are my nice ones!....Don't falter!

The turrets shuddered in thrice-repeated shocks and for Chernetsov there was nothing sweeter than to hear this jarring....And behind his back stood a round-faced Capt-2d Rank, and he had brought to the turret's semidarkness of battle a notepad, holding it right up to his glasses and hastily writing....Both Chernetsov and Fedonyuk, and everyone who saw him here, thought that he was an umpire from the staff. But the officer--Leonid Klimchenko--wrote no notes at all for the forthcoming critique:

And again I dream at night, And singeing the sore memory is The summer lightning of artillery Over the ship's sharp sternpost.

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Damage Control Work Cited

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 3, Feb 82 (signed to press 13 Jan 82) p 16

[Article by Lt V. Dandykin: "An Encounter in a Blazing Hold"]

[Text] That evening Smn N. Shatov, agitator of the emergency rescue group, held a discussion meeting on the subject, "The Fathers' Feats Are the Sons' Wings." Igor'

excitedly told his colleagues about the heroism of Ivan Karpovich Golubets. Suddenly at the most interesting part, these words interrupted him: "Emergency rescue group personnel, fall in! The poop, starboard side."

An emergency alarm! They acted with precision and rapidity. In a few minutes the group, under communist officers M. Rogozhin and A. Knysh, left for the facility that had suffered a disaster.

The inside of a ship of the civil fleet was burning. Having subdued the flames more than once, it had become clear to them that the struggle would not be easy.

PO 1st Class I. Shatov and Smn V. Pasechkin went to the raging fire. The others hurried to follow them.

The sailors made a reconnaissance quickly: they determined the scope and seat of the fire. And they began their work. Time stopped, it seemed. Five times Smn Pasechkin went down in. He obviously had tired. But he offered no sign of it. He even winked at his comrades and said with chapped lips: "I'm going to warm myself."

It seemed that the fire would rage indefinitely, burning everything in its path. It seemed that the Black Sea sailors would disappear endlessly into the hold. Towards morning Sr Smn Babich and V. Birvert said simultaneously, "It is surrendering."

But the sailors still needed long hours to finally subdue the flames. And now the long-awaited, "The fire is completely localized" was sounded.

In the evening they were warmly greeted on the ship. They were fed a tasty supper but were not asked questions, for it was obvious that their eyes, red from lack of sleep, were beginning to stick together.

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NAVAL FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF HIGH QUALIFICATIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) p 8

[Article by Guards Warrant Officer Ye. Artem'yev, master, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "The Sea Obliges Us"]

[Text] We recently read a letter in this journal titled "Our Duty to be Masters." Many different opinions arose in the discussion of this publication: Everyone realizes that life, the conditions of service and the technical revolution in military affairs require that we constantly improve our professional knowledge and become masters of military affairs.

But some young warrant officers, while agreeing with us in principle, spoke of the struggle for the master title as something in the distant future, as something that it was still to early to think about. There still were many hard bridges to cross in their development, in learning their complex duties, they said. They had yet to become specialists 2d and 1st class. This is true. Master of combat qualification is the highest peak. And it is accessible only to purposeful, diligent and disciplined soldiers. But if they do not set this goal before themselves from the very beginning, they would find it almost impossible to reach it.

This discussion of the letter never did come to its conclusion. The timidity of the young warrant officers was left unanswered. This is why I suggest continuing this discussion on the pages of this journal. After all, there are many young warrant officers in other units and aboard other ships who are apparently also experiencing such timidity in determining the bounds for improving their combat proficiency. And this is having a negative influence on the development of young specialists.

Let me cite an example. Once after spending some time at port, a submarine left for the sea to practice some of the elements of navigation in a coastal zone. During one of the exercises commands were transmitted to the battle stations and other instructions were issued and executed. It seemed asifeverything had been done as required. But the boat was unable to complete the necessary maneuver. Specialists—mainly the damage control mechanics—sought the cause of the problem. But they never could find it. This was despite the fact that warrant officers who were in no way novices were responsible for the mechanisms. They simply failed to carefully study the materiel during the time the boat was undergoing repairs, and just prior to the cruise itself. "There's time enough," they said, whenever someone

brought up the question of assimilating the complex equipment faster. Consequently by the time of this important stage in the combat training, there was not a single master in the boat's subunit. Thus in the first real test, the warrant officers found themselves in a difficult position. It was at their fault that the unexpected occurred.

The craft commander was compelled to ask for assistance from his neighbors. Warrant Officer Yevgeniy Ivanovich Panarin was immediately sent over from our boat. Descending into the submarine, he quickly analyzed the cause of the problem and corrected it. It turned out that one of the valves was not working. The fault would seem to be a simple one. But unfortunately, the specialists were unable to detect it. But Panarin was. Because he is a master of combat qualifications. Moreover he became one much earlier than did some of his peers. He did not experience timidity before the complex equipment. He perfected his skills while the boat was at port and during its cruises. And there has been more than one occasion in which the warrant officer's high professional training was the decisive factor in the completion of training missions at sea.

Warrant Officer A. Rublev is presently a member of our crew. He is an experienced radio-telegrapher—the formation's best specialist and a soldier of high technical culture with considerable practical experience in the complex conditions of ocean cruises. He has often had to demonstrate his high professional training. Warrant Officer Rublev's knowledge and skills, his efficiency and his self-control had a positive influence on the results of a recent cruise.

We have many such warrant officers. Were we to analyze the course of their development, it would not be difficult to note that they are diligent in studying the equipment, they are not frightened by its complexity, and they achieved the top class ratings and then became masters ahead of everyone else.

Service aboard ship consists primarily of cruises, both long and short. Such service is a good school to the submariner, as well as a strict examiner. After all, anything can happen at sea. And when something does happen, you can't call in a master from shore. It is only on yourself that you can count on, on your own knowledge and skills.

And the aviation warrant officers who asserted in their letter that raising individual proficiency is a very important problem are quite correct. All branches of our armed forces are now outfitted with complex, modern combat equipment. Such equipment and weapons are aboard our craft as well. These menacing crew-operated weapons were entrusted to us by our people for the motherland's defense. These weapons have enormous possibilities. But to know how to utilize them fully, superficial knowledge would not be enough. We must penetrate into the essence of the work of all mechanisms and instruments, and we need firm skills in their control. This means that we must know the equipment and weapons deeply, so that we would be ready to enter into combat against aggressors at any moment, and emerge the victors.

Let me get back to my own boat. We have a friendly collective of warrant officers. Many have had considerable cruising experience. The fact that two departments are outstanding is owing in many ways to the warrant officers. Our crew inherited the combat traditions of the legendary Red Banner Guards submarine "S-56." During the

Great Patriotic War it left our fleet for the Northern Fleet. And there, in the uninviting waters of the Arctic, it sunk enemy transporters and ships. The entire crew displayed real heroism. It was manifested primarily in high combat proficiency. The seamen delivered their torpedoes right on target, and they repaired damage to mechanisms under water in the face of depth charge explosions. And today, torpedo specialist A. Shestakov, sonar operator V. Ovcharov and other warrant officers aboard ship are continuing the glory of specialists of the wartime years—sonar operator A. Shumikhin, torpedo specialist I. Lempert and others. To them, it is a high honor to be called the successors of wartime specialists. Such an honor places many obligations upon every warrant officer.

Today the commander and the party and Komsomol organizations are mobilizing us to raise our professional level. We have been given a goal: Every squad chief and every technician must earn the "master" title. Assuming we work hard and work together, nothing can stop us from doing so. Providing assistance and mutual aid is one of the items of our socialist pledges. The subunit commanders and the warrant officers who were already masters will provide assistance to men such as warrant officers A. Izgaryshev, S. Pashin and A. Petrenko, whose professional growth had come to a standstill. By the end of the training year, the number of masters aboard ship must increase significantly. It cannot be any way else. The interests of the motherland's protection obligate us to keep getting better. And the party calls upon each of us, no matter where we work, to work better and more effectively. This will be our contribution to fulfilling the decisions of our party's 26th Congress.

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NAVAL FORCES

VISIT OF MISSILE CRUISER 'VARYAG' TO SRV DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82 p 18

[Article by Guards Warrant Officer R. Aleyev, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Beneath the Flag of Friendship: On a Visit of Pacific Fleet Seamen to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam"]

[Text] Absence from the motherland makes the heart grow fonder. Every seaman who has been on a distant cruise knows this. He who has never had the experience of being away from the motherland will probably never understand and feel, with all of his heart and being, how much he loves it and how infinitely precious it is to him. This is why that evening on which our ship loosed its moorings and assumed a course toward the city and port of Danang in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is so memorable to me and my fellow servicemen. A detachment of Soviet warships consisting of the Guards missile cruiser "Varyag" and the escort ship "Razyashchiy" under the command of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet's first deputy commander Vice Admiral N. Yasakov departed for this fraternal country for an official friendly visit.

The outline of our native shores disappeared beyond the horizon. The "Varyag" held a southward course. As always, life aboard snip was strict and measured. One shift followed another. A socialist competition was organized from the first day of the cruise. The results were summarized daily. Everything was as usual. And yet, the way each of us felt inside made an imprint on the cruise, making it an unusual one. We felt ourselves to be the ambassadors of our fleet, of the whole country, and we remembered the words of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, who said that to Soviet communists, solidarity with Vietnam is the will of both the heart and the mind. Soviet-Vietnamese friendship is based on common interests and goals, on a firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism.

The ship's communists did much to keep the cruise safe and accident-free, and they took care to see that everything would be fully prepared for the friendly meeting. Party and Komsomol meetings were held.

A ritual dedicated to the memory of Russian seamen who had fought heroically in the battle of Tsushima was held in strict solemnity, in an emotionally charged atmosphere. Monuments to the fatherland's defenders are not erected at sea. But the points of naval glory are marked on the map of every Soviet navigator. In the morning on the third day of the cruise we formed up on the poop. The ship's political worker opened the short meeting. Guards soldiers approached the

microphone one after another. They vowed to carry the Soviet flag over the seas with honor, and to be just as faithful to the fatherland as were the Russian seamen of the heroic "Varyag"--valorous sons of the motherland who had participated in the liberation of North Korea, southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and who had traveled this same course in 1945. A hymn of mourning sounded over the sea. The seamen knelt. Wreaths were laid in the Tsushima waters to the accompaniment of rifle reports.

Each day of the cruise brought us closer to the land of socialist Vietnam. And soon came the morning in which the "Varyag" and "Razyashchiy" reached the Bay of Danang in the company of an escort vessel of the SRV Navy. Green mountains with rounded summits could be seen through the thick curtain of rain. They were huddled together at the shore, looking like an honor guard of legendary soldiers. Thousands of Vietnamese greeted us at the port. Triumphant music, slogans of welcome and smiles all made it known to us that we had been expected.

So began what was termed our friendly visit. Our meetings with Vietnamese friends confirmed the correctness of this term. My job was to answer questions about some displays to visitors to the ship. I found it a joy to describe the peace-loving foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, what the people had achieved in implementing the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's visit to the Pacific Fleet.

An endless stream of people walked the decks of the ship. I can recall the many affable faces, graced with friendly smiles. The Vietnamese visitors listened to my explanations attentively. They asked questions. They expressed delight. I did not have very much time to speak with each Vietnamese. Nevertheless it was not difficult to assess the overall mood. It could be expressed by a single word, "friendship!" From the responses, the smiles and the words of gratefulness, we could see that these were brothers of the same class, people who had wrested their freedom from 20th century colonists in a savage struggle.

Especially memorable to me was a meeting with youth organization representatives headed by Fan N"y Lam, assistant secretary of the Danang Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. "Soviet seamen," he said, "showed us their formidable weapons and described their life and development of communism. This made a great impression on the young Vietnamese. We will always remember that the Soviet people are our real friends."

The deck of the ship was especially crowded. Mementos were being exchanged. Vietnamese Komsomol members gratefully received books on V. I. Lenin and on the party, and books by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev translated into Vietnamese. Friendly contacts were established amazingly quickly between people who did not know each other's language. When an interpreter is nowhere to be found, gestures, facial expressions and songs come to the rescue. After all, friendship has its own language. It is understood well both by Soviet and Vietnamese Komsomol members.

One of the sailors pulled out a guitar, and the Russian melodies began flowing. Two Vietnamese girls studying at the Danang Polytechnical Institute, Fan Tkhi Khoa and Kiyu Loan, sang some Komsomol songs, and some lyrical ones as well. Then we all got together to sing the "Varyag" song. We began "Katyusha." To our surprise and joy, the Vietnamese Komsomol members joined in.

The seamen took tours to the city of Danang. The port is several kilometers away from the city. Coconut palms and banana trees line both sides of the road. Soon a railroad will connect the city to the port. The pace of its construction is now at its peak. After its completion, Danang will become an integral transportation center.

Prior to our arrival the rainy season, which brings joy to the farmers, began in the country. We saw how passionately the peasants labored in the rice fields, literally oblivious to the rain.

We drove into the city on a bridge spanning the banks of the Danang River. Red posters and banners bearing words of greeting in honor of the communist parties of the two friendly countries, in Russian and Vietnamese, covered the streets. The city's inhabitants smiled affably, and the children sonorously chanted "Liyen so!," which means "Soviet people." The city-port of Danang, it would seem, lived only for the visit of the Soviet ship these days. We were greeted like the dearest guests. And this elicited reciprocal feelings. Pride for our great motherland overflowed in all of us.

Our send-off evolved into a demonstration of friendship.

When we departed for our return trip, we had no idea how difficult it would be. We managed to evade a cyclone, but the bad weather we could not avoid. One day followed the next, and the wind and waves did nothing but grow more violent, as if wishing to test the firmness of our armor and the strength of our bodies and spirits. And the main load had to be carried on the shoulders of specialists of the electrical and engineering division. It is not an easy thing to keep a ship traveling at its prescribed speed during a storm. But the personnel of this leading subunit, which was commanded by Guards Captain 3d Rank V. Korshunov, did an outstanding job. Competitors who had taken the lead included watch mechanic Communist Guards Captain-Lieutenant A. Kotlyarov, Komsomol members Guards petty officers 2d class V. Sharshakov, A. Bukharov and V. Kuznetsov, and others.

Many of the Guards soldiers upgraded their class qualifications and acquired considerable practical experience during the long cruise. The crew fully satisfied the socialist pledges it adopted for the cruise.

The ship soon neared the shores of home. Our native land is like a mother, both strict and gentle. And when she is met once again following a long absence, one's lungs burst with joy and the heart beats faster. And one wishes to glorify the world in which one lives, and which one defends as a son of the Country of the Soviets, the motherland of October.

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LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

SHORELINE MINING EXERCISES DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) pp 6-7

[Article by Warrant Officer S. Dudnik, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Mines Beneath the Water"]

[Text] Complex and diverse are the missions of combat engineers providing engineer support to coastal defenses. It is our job to set up various antiassault landing obstacles in the water and on shore, drop buoys to serve as reference points for defensive artillery, operate within mobile obstacle construction detachments laying minefields across the path of penetrating "enemy" troops and create passages for surprise counterattacks. This requires firm knowledge and habits, sensible initiative and high psychological maturity of everyone.

The engineer subunit in which Junior Sergeant A. Oksas commands a combat engineer squad encountered many difficulties in a certain tactical exercise. Operating in a complex situation and in unfavorable weather, the combat engineers displayed excellent field skills, and they confidently executed their missions associated with coastal antiassault landing defenses.

The surf hissed at it crawled over the sand in waves. It was precisely here, in this lowlying area, that the "enemy" intended to land a marine assault force. Our command decided to create stable defenses in this place. Combat engineers were given an important role in this mission.

The commander meticulously studied the engineer intelligence. The sea state and the condition of the bottom of the near-shore strip permitted the laying of beach mines. The platoon completed this mission according to the team drill method. By breaking the area down into sections beforehand and marking the locations of the obstacles to be laid in the water and on shore, we speeded up the work considerably.

The combat engineers laid the ballast slabs out on the sand along the water line, spaced apart in correspondence with the spacing between the mines. They arranged them in rows equal to the number of rows to be contained in the underwater minefield. After this, training mines and fuses were brought up to the slabs.

The soldiers formed up in a single rank on the shore before the mines, which were laid out in a certain order. The commander broke the platoon down into squads of two men each. Junior sergeants A. Oksas and V. Yurkov, commanders of outstanding sections, found themselves in neighboring pairs of competitors, as did combat engineers Private 1st Class V. Bugay and Private O. Zharavin.

"Arm the mines!"

In response to this command the squads approached the mines in the first row above the water line and began assembling them. First they connected the mines to their support, after which they inserted the fuses. Junior Sergeant Oksas and Private 1st Class Bugay completed this operation the fastest. Their rivals in the competition in the other squads were not far behind.

Then came the critical moment in which the mines, secured to the slabs and armed, had to be carried to the water and lowered to the bottom at the indicated places. Carrying the heavy loads in their arms, the squads boldly stepped into the foaming breakers and entered the frigid water chest-deep. On occasion a playful wave would inundate them completely. Special clothes protected the soldiers from the water.

After the farthest row of the minefield was laid, the combat engineers returned to the shore for the next set of mines. And once again they entered the sea, this time laying them in line with the row of markers closer to shore. The combat work proceeded at an ever-increasing pace, without a single error, attesting to the high preparedness of the specialists.

After laying the minefield in one underwater section, the platoon went on to the next without delay.

The combat engineers worked just as competently and selflessly on antiassault landing obstacles on shore. An antitank minefield was set up and camouflaged using minelayers. They significantly surpassed the combat standard in this case.

The combat engineers were successful because they had carefully practiced the different methods of laying antitank and antipersonnel mines in different terrain conditions and in all times of the year. In the course of intense training, they learn to lay minefields both by hand and with mechanized resources. Specialists acquired experience in laying beach mines at sea using organic flotation equipment. Army experts took amphibious tracked transporters and mounted simple and dependable removable equipment on them, making it possible to quickly drop mines in a near-shore strip.

The combat engineers are also able to achieve outstanding results because of the great combat rivalry maintained in all field lessons. Each day of intense military labor brings them closer to fulfillment of the socialist pledges they adopted in the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR.

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SOVIET VIEWS ON GLOBAL 'HOT SPOTS'

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 3, Mar 82 (signed to press 22 Feb 82) pp 26-27

[Article by Captain 3d Rank A. Shcheglov]

[Text] Lenin's statement that imperialism was and is the main source of military danger is being confirmed with special clarity today. The threat to peace has grown greater than ever before. Attempts by imperialist circles to inflame centers of tension in the Far East, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean basin are unceasing; moreover American imperialists have recently assumed the road of direct interference into the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic.

"Adventurism, a preparedness to stake the vital interests of mankind on their own narrow mercenary goals—this is especially obvious in the policy of the most aggres—sive circles of imperialism," asserted the 26th CPSU Congress. "They have truly assumed the goal of reaching the unreachable—raising a barrier in the way of progressive changes in the world, and regaining the role of the rulers of the people's destinies."

The United States of America has declared a number of regions, including ones many thousands of kilometers away, to be spheres of its "vital interests." The war machine of the USA is forcing its way into these regions in a most aggressive manner, and it was mainly to achieve its aggressive ends that Washington created its "rapid deployment forces."

Tension in the Near and Middle East and in zones of the Indian Ocean contiguous with this area has not decreased for many years. The USA is making an increasingly more active effort to strengthen its military presence in this area. Following the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran and "matter of the hostages" provoked by Washington, a powerful grouping of American warships carrying hundreds of airplanes and thousands of marines appeared in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf. The USA has reached agreement with Oman, Kenya and Somali permitting the American "rapid deployment force" to use the military bases of these countries in exchange for military and economic aid.

Continuing to create tension in this area of the world, in 1981 the USA conducted maneuvers code-named "Bright Star," unprecedented in all of postwar history. Over the enormous expanses of the Near East, from the Mediterranean coast and the deserts of Egypt to the Arabian Sea, large airborne and marine assault landing forces were landed one after another, bombs and shells tore the countryside apart, and the whine

of engines and the clatter of tanks and armored personnel carries could be heard. More than 4,000 American servicemen engaged in mock combat on Egyptian soil and in the air. About 500 tanks and armored transporters and a large quantity of airplanes and helicopters took part in the maneuvers. B-52 strategic bombers raised aloft from air bases in the USA made bombing strikes on targets on Egyptian territory.

This largest of all military demonstrations of the USA in this part of our planet was unique in that it embraced not only the territory of Egypt but also a number of other countries that have become Pentagon strongpoints—Sudan, Somali and Oman. These countries and Egypt border on Libya, Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. One interesting fact is that the maneuvers were more aggressive and provocative than before, and they had a clearly expressed anti-Soviet orientation. Another step was taken in the further expansion of American military preparations in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

The ruling circles of the USA are attempting to show the American armored fist to all countries of this area and to the forces of national liberation, and demonstrate their constant readiness and resolve to place it into motion with the purpose of reaching their aspirations.

The USA has declared Israel to be its "strategic ally" in the Near East. An American-Israeli memorandum on mutual assistance in the area of strategic cooperation was signed in December of the past year by the defense secretaries of the USA and Israel. The coordination council of the two countries, created in compliance with this document, will plan and prepare joint military maneuvers and draw up the guidelines for deploying American weapons on Israeli territory and for military deliveries. Moreover in the event that the USA engages in military operations in the Near East, Israel has offered to participate directly in such actions.

For many long years, relying on the constant, practically unlimited support of the USA, Israel has occupied foreign lands and infringed upon the legal rights of the Palestinians. It continues its terrorist acts against Lebanon, and it threatens the vital interests of other Arab countries as well as their sovereignty and their existence itself. In December of the past year the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) decided to extend the force of this country's laws to the Golan Heights, thus undertaking an attempt at their direct annexation. The actions of Israel elicited the decisive condemnation of Arab and world public. But in a vote held in January of this year at the UN Security Council on a resolution to impose sanctions against Israel, the USA took its satellite under its protection and vetoed its adoption. These actions by the ruling circles of the USA and Israel made the situation in the Near East even more acute.

Imperialist circles of the West are displeased by the growing independence of liberated countries. They are using all means in their attempts to tie these countries to themselves, so that they could dispose of their resources and utilize their territory for their own aggressive purposes at their own discretion. An example of such an approach by the Western countries can be found in the war between Iran and Iraq, which is now in its second year. It is absolutely senseless from the standpoint of the interests of these states, but it is advantageous to imperialist bosses who would wish to weaken the warring countries and regain their positions in this region.

The situation in the Far East and in Southeast Asia continues to be alarming. Ignoring the lessons of its own history, the United States of America is encouraging the rebirth of Japanese militarism and promoting reinforcement of China's military potential, counting on its use against the Soviet Union in behalf of its imperialist aims. The USA's plan to supply American offensive weapons and other modern military equipment to China is making the situation much more serious.

Developing military-political cooperation among themselves, American imperialists, Japanese militants and Chinese hegemonists are initiating a noisy campaign centered on the myth of a "Soviet military threat"; they are sowing mistrust and discord between Asian states, and provoking conflicts between them. But as we know, the real military threat in this region of the world emanates mainly from the USA and China. It is the American administration which is expanding the network of its military bases, including its nuclear arsenals, in this region, and encouraging transformation of Pakistan's territory into a base for the training of armed bands being ferried into Afghanistan. There are now 135,000 American soldiers and officers concentrated in East Asia and in the West Pacific.

The situation in the south of Africa continues to be complex and tense. With the direct complicity of the USA, other Western countries and China, South African racists are pursuing their policy of plunder here. The Republic of South Africa is continuing its aggression against the People's Republic of Angola as part of Pretoria's broad strategy aimed at destabilizing young independent states in the south of Africa. Racists are trying to preserve their control over the country's southern regions at all costs, hoping to disorganize life in all of Angola and sow fear and uncertainty in the future in the people.

Together with the USA and China, the Republic of South Africa is continuing to arm and send UNITA bands into Angola to play the role of racist accomplices. Their leaders are prepared to fulfill the most infamous instructions of their masters. This is an accurate description of the function being performed by (Savimbi) (the chief of UNITA) and his assistants in creating a so-called "buffer zone" in the Angolan district of Cunene, a significant part of which is still occupied by South African troops. The ruling circles of the Republic of South Africa hope to camouflage their actual control over this territory by making it appear that they have transferred power to the hands of UNITA.

Implementing its criminal strategic plans in southern Africa, the Republic of South Africa is extensively employing various methods. Among them are economic pressure and sabotage, intelligence operations, the training and infiltration of counterrevolutionary bands, and organization of conspiracies with the purpose of overthrowing regimes objectionable to South African racists.

For a number of years American ruling circles have continually caused tension in Central America and the Caribbean basin. The situation in this part of the world grew especially acute in 1981. The fault with this lay in the policy pursued by Washington, which had long since declared the Caribbean Sea and Central America a zone of "the USA's vitally important national interests." The cutting edge of American imperialism's provocative policy is directed mainly against the Islands of Freedom. Naval maneuvers are being conducted practically continuously by the shores of Cuba, and assault landings are practiced for all to see on the territory

of the American base of Guantanamo, located on Cuban soil and held illegally by the USA. Intensive military training of emigrant rabble that have entrenched themselves in the United States is continuing. The economic blockade of Cuba is intensifying.

Brazen pressure is being applied on Nicaragua and Grenada, and the USA's open interference in the affairs of El Salvador is continuing. The USA is constantly strengthening its military presence in this region. There are more than 26,000 American servicemen in countries of Central America and the Caribbean basin. It was decided in December of last year to reorganize the staff of the Caribbean operational formation into a new regional command of the Pentagon. The ruling circles of the USA have decided to create a radio station which is broadcasting into Cuba with the purpose of slandering socialism, sowing provocative rumors and inducing fear.

However, the ruling elite in the USA is mistaken in thinking that it could frighten the Cuban people by blackmail and crude attacks. "We will endure," wrote the Cuban newspaper GRANMA. "We have proven many times that the imperialists are incapable of causing us fear." The country's Communist Party and government are taking all necessary steps to strengthen the republic's defense capabilities. Cuba is a member of the fraternity of brotherly socialist states. The assistance and support of the countries of socialism and of all progressive mankind are on its side.

No matter where "hot spots" appear on the planet, one will always find the hand of the aggressive circles of imperialism, and mainly of the USA. But now the intrigues of reaction are experiencing opposition from the consolidated forces of socialism, peace and progress.

Replying to questions from the American television corporation NBC, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "We must reduce tension, quench the dangerous centers of crisis, abandon the policy of a meaningless arms race and return to the road of normal relations between states...." Such is the sole correct highway which all countries and continents should be following in their historical development.

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